Øivind Andersen:

Im Garten der Rhetorik. Die Kunst der Rede in der Antike

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Øivind Andersen takes the metaphor of the “Garden of Eloquence” much further than his Renaissance predecessor Henry Peacham (1577). Whereas Peacham arranged his subject matter in a very strict and systematic way (resembling the formal garden in horticulture), Andersen decides to follow neither him nor the modern systematic accounts of classical rhetoric such as – to name some books in German – Richard Volkmann, Heinrich Lausberg, and Josef Martin. Nor does Andersen provide a historical outline of ancient rhetoric, supplemented by separate chapters or appendices on the rhetorical system as do Werner Eisenhut, Manfred Fuhrmann, Gert Ueding, and, most recently, Laurent Pernot. Rather, he focuses on thematic aspects such as communication, argumentation, and pedagogy (p. 11), and likens ancient rhetoric between 500 BC and AD 500 to an English landscape garden through which he wishes to stroll together with his reader. But that does not mean that Andersen discards the historical and systematic aspects, he only subordinates them to the larger issues which form – in eight chapters – the beds and plots of his garden. The reader’s judgement of the book will depend on his sense of whether Andersen succeeds in giving both a systematic and historical introduction and at the same time an analysis of the main problems of ancient rhetorical communication.

Having laid out the plan of his garden, Andersen gives in his introduction “at the garden’s gate” (“An der Gartenpforte”, pp. 11-23) a short overview of the authors on which his text is going to be based. The trio Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian will frequently be joined and supplemented by Plato, Isocrates, and others. The discussion of ancient (and modern) definitions of rhetoric stressing the question of including moral conditions points forward to chapter VI and gives the first hint of Andersen’s attitude to the impact rhetoric might have in the modern world.

Chapter I (“Rhetorische Kommunikation”, pp. 25-59) continues the discussion of definition and explains the concept of kairos as key to the ‘rhetorical situation’. The ability to communicate with an audience is founded on the psychological training of the orator, and in argumentation (which is also the subject of chapter IV) ethos and pathos come into focus. Embedded in this presentation are the systematic elements of the three branches of rhetoric (deliberative, judicial, epideictic), the three officia of the orator (docere, delectare, movere), the five stages of production (readers should be made aware of the ancient terminological problem here – officia is applied in two different ways), and the principles of disposition.

The treatment of language and style in Chapter II (“Sprache und Stil”, pp. 60-94) complements the more traditional presentation of the qualities of style (prepon and aptum should have

1 Full references for all works cited are given in the list at the end of the review.
earned an entry in the index) and *ornatus*,\(^2\) with remarks on the relation of ordinary language and language in rhetoric, and the conflict of Asianism and Atticism, where Andersen follows closely Cicero’s construction of its development. Andersen has a very personal stake in the matter and perhaps colours the tradition in his favour.

With “orality” (“Mündlichkeit”) in Chapter III (pp. 95-138) Andersen takes up a focus of learned interest over recent years and widens his scope to include philosophy (Plato) and historiography (Thucydides).\(^3\) Although the characterization of the ‘oral culture’ may seem on occasion too simplistic (“most people could neither read nor write”, pp. 95), Andersen’s at times rather associative discussion of oral composition, improvisation, problems of publication, memory, delivery, sound and rhythm, and Gorgianic ‘power of the word’ not only covers topics of the system, but serves to fill out the cultural background of the orator’s performance.

Rhetorical argumentation (“Rhetorische Argumentation”, chapter IV, pp. 139-164) is based on the concept of ‘probability’ (*eikos*), which has recently attracted the attention of scholars. Andersen presents a predominantly Aristotelian interpretation (although Aristotle, unlike Andersen p. 142, distinguishes between *eikota* and *semeia*, ‘signs’), where perhaps a clearer distinction from the function of *eikos* in Plato’s system could have added historical depth. Continuity between Plato and Aristotle seems also to be the guiding principle in the presentation of rhetoric’s use of dialectic. Deductive and inductive reasoning based on, respectively, enthymeme and example form the backbone of rhetorical argumentation, but here Andersen is not precise enough, because his interest lies less in the development of concepts than in their systematic interplay: for Aristotle (whose authority again dominates the passage on pp. 150ff.) the enthymeme is not necessarily defined as a truncated syllogism, since truncation only later became a defining property.\(^4\) After a longer section on special and common topics (*topoi*) and a very short introduction to the *stasis* theory, Andersen concludes the chapter by letting the reader catch a glimpse of the contemporary applicability of such ancient forms of argumentation (e.g. in law).

The title of chapter V (pp. 165-200) on rhetoric and philosophy as “teaching subject” (“Lehrfach”) is slightly misleading, because its first two thirds illustrate the main stages in the contest between rhetoric and philosophy for the leading role in education from the sophists to Aelius Aristides. The core of the chapter is taken up by an extensive translated excerpt (pp. 170-181 including interpretation) of Plato’s *Gorgias*, which is contrasted with Isocrates’s idea of *philosopheia* and with characterizations of the different stances taken by philosophical schools towards rhetoric. This consequently leads to the image of the *perfectus orator* advertised so eloquently by Cicero and Quintilian.

Chapter VI (pp. 201-218) can be read as an extension of the previous one (from the *orator perfectus* to the *vir bonus*), since the “ethical problems and perspectives” (“Ethische Probleme und Perspektiven”) Andersen discusses here deal with the relation of means and ends of persuasion, the personality of the orator, the artificiality of his rhetorical performance, and the contribution of style to the creation of his image. The chapter frequently picks up various topics already treated in the book (such as *ethos*, the different branches of oratory, the audience, and rhetoric as communication, from chapters I, II, and V) and rearranges them in relation to the orator’s self-representation and his public. As a whole the chapter therefore lacks the intrinsic unity that characterizes other parts of the book.

\(^2\) The criteria used for the systematization of figures of speech are in fact Stoic, which is only made clear on p. 188. The choice of German examples to illustrate stylistic features is to be welcomed in principle although they are not always perfectly appropriate.

\(^3\) Thomas 1992 should have been added to the bibliography.

\(^4\) Cf. Kraus 1994, p. 1199. And the Greek plural of *enthymema* should be (p. 185) *enthymemata*. 
In the longest chapter of the book, chapter VII (“Rhetorik, Pädagogik und Kultur”, pp. 219-273), Andersen tries to place rhetoric in its cultural context, that is, within general education, *enkyklios paideia*. The three prerequisites for a rhetorical career, talent, training, theoretical education (*natura/ingenium, usus/exercitatio, ars*), and their respective weight in ancient theory give the cue for a section on imitation. In Andersen’s view the link is formed by the predominance of nature, which as the object of *mimesis* is central to ancient aesthetics. The development from here to the imitation of literary examples as part of rhetorical training is not presented as problematic, although the transition from Plato to Dionysius of Halicarnassus’s *De imitazione* may be less smooth than Andersen suggests. It should be added that this is the only context in which Augustine makes his appearance in the book. The pedagogical principles of practical teaching are explained by Andersen in a very short sketch of the ancient educational system (pp. 232-241; and pp. 269-271, which could actually have been placed under the same heading), but he grants ample space to a thorough and instructive presentation of preliminary exercises (*progymnasmata*) and training speeches (*suasoriae* and *controversiae*). An important topic is raised with the subchapter on “rhetorization of culture” (“Rhetorisierung der Kultur”, pp. 255-268): Andersen concentrates on the period of the Second Sophistic, which indeed offers plenty of examples, but this reader would have liked to hear more about the rhetorical principles of thinking that permeated the whole of ancient culture (and not only literature) at least from the classical period onwards. The passage on literature (pp. 266-268) does give some important hints but is far from sounding the depths of literature’s immersion into rhetoric. Therefore the terms chosen by Andersen to describe the culture of the second century AD, “Greco-Roman and rhetorical-philosophical mixed culture” (“Mischkultur”) or “Pagan-Christian, sophistic-theological culture”, will not be easy to use as analytical tools, not least because Christian rhetoric – with very few exceptions – is practically absent from the book in general.

Of equal importance is the theme of chapter VIII, “rhetoric and society” (“Rhetorik und Gesellschaft”, pp. 274-307). The role of rhetoric – not always differentiated from that of speech in general – in the development of culture is part of an anthropological model that places *logos* at its centre. Here the reader gets what comes closest to a ‘history of ancient rhetoric’, as Andersen summarizes the development of rhetoric according to the three branches of oratory in Athens (pp. 280-289) and Rome (pp. 289-304). The ancient historian might be more hesitant in this context about the use as reliable witnesses of Thucydides for the text of deliberative speeches and of Livy for Menenius Agrippa’s oratory. The last pages on the “orator in society” with its eulogies by ancient authors of the orator and oratory also indirectly bear witness to Andersen’s convictions (which he rarely lets intrude into his text) that “logos is what makes humans human and creates a truly human society” (p. 304). This implicit conviction of the relevance of rhetoric to modern societies is borne out by an afterword by Gert Ueding in which he interprets speech as a pragmatic instrument of action within society (pp. 309-313).

Andersen constantly brings the reader close to the ancient texts. The perspective of the reception of classical rhetoric is only rarely hinted at (Burke, Gras, Perelman, Petrarca, and Vico make short appearances), but this is part of Andersen’s strategy to let the texts themselves prove their relevance for his contemporaries. In parts of the book this strategy leads to a kind of patchwork technique: when the main text is already a paraphrase of an ancient source, and is then followed by a verbatim quotation and continued by another paraphrase, a new text is created through recombination of excerpts. Andersen is here more looking for continuity and harmony than for contrast and contradiction between texts. Historical evolution in most cases gives way to

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5 One could have wished for a little more attention e.g. to Fronto, who is referred to only in passing on p. 188, n. 257, for he certainly does discuss the value of rhetorical education for society (or at least for an emperor). Moreover, Schmitz 1997 should have been added to the bibliography.
systematic consistency. This perspective is justified in so far as systematic outlines have to be
drawn up, but sometimes it creates disruptions when historical developments\(^6\) have to be
accounted for (e.g. in the discussion of the three types of style, pp. 84ff., or the relation between
rhetoric and dialectic, pp. 143ff.). The switching between the historical, the systematic, and the
thematic focus is not always easy to follow.

Andersen’s technique also has another effect. Strolling through a garden a visitor may come
back to the same place from different directions and gain a new perspective on the same plants.
Likewise, the reader will encounter the same topics or even the same texts in Andersen’s book
in different chapters under different headings. This is not necessarily a fault, but it presupposes
a reader who does not read the book from cover to cover, but chooses the chapters most inter-
esting to him. The systematic reader may at times become less receptive to the repeated texts.

Since the original texts in translation form the core of the book, it is regrettable that editing and
translation do not fully meet the standards required of a book which a committed specialist has
written for a wider public. It seems indeed that this is becoming an increasing problem in the
modern academic world where fewer readers are proficient in fewer languages and more books
have to be translated – and the translation of Andersen’s book is very welcome indeed. Especially
where ancient texts are concerned, linguistic skill and scholarly competence (in-
cluding proficiency in ancient languages) rarely reach the same level. Also in this case, despite
their checking the Norwegian version against the Greek and Latin original texts and the avail-
able German translations, some mistakes escaped the notice of the translators:

German word order and mood is not observed for Tacitus, *Dialogus* 1,2 *existimandum* <sit>:
“denn man müßte […] urteilen” (not “denn muß man […] urteilen”) (p. 15). In Quintilian,
*Institutio oratoria* II,15,37, the sense is distorted by a wrong negation: “nie etwas mit Worten
auszudrücken, die nicht andere vor ihnen schon gesagt haben” (p. 16), (that is, “never express
anything in words that others have not already used before them”, but correctly: “never express
anything in words that others have already used before them”). Cicero’s *De optimo genere oratorum*
was the introduction to the translation of two speeches (not “works on rhetoric”) (p.
49). The translation of Cicero, *Brutus* 258 (*aetatis illius fuit laus tamquam innocentiae sic
Latine loquendi*) contradicts its context; it should be “wir bewundern die frühere Zeit nicht
weniger (“not less than” instead of “mehr”, “more”) wegen ihrer hohen Moral wie (“als”) wegen
ihres guten Latein” (p. 65). Asianists did not fight “hieb- und stichfest” (which would
apply to a “water-tight” argumentation, not to style), but “with sharp-edged (rhetorical,
linguistic) weapons” (p. 91). The addition of “und” in “und die der großzügige Cicero” makes
the connection of the relative clause unclear (p. 92). Aristotle’s *katestrammene lexis* should not
be called “umgekehrter” (“inverted”) style but rather “verschlungener” or “gegliederter”
(“self-evident”) (p. 136), nor are Greek *semeia* “Wahrscheinlichkeiten” (“probabilities”) (p.
142). Twice (pp. 211 and 275) Aristotle’s *Politics* is quoted as “Der Staatsmann” (“The
Politician”) (mixed up with Plato’s *Politikos*). The correct translation of the example from Ps.-
Hermogenes is “we are no longer inquiring, […] whether this person is a temple robber […] but
we amplify the fact as proved” (Kennedy 2003, p. 79) (p. 245). The author of Ps.-Xenophon,
*The Constitution of the Athenians* (to be dated perhaps two decades earlier than “shortly before
400 BC”, p. 280), is sometimes called “The Old Oligarch” in English. In German “Der alte
Oligarch” is less common, but “Die alte Oligarchie” is wrong (p. 280). Scaevola in Cicero’s *De
oratore* “dämpft” (“checks”) Crassus’ enthusiasm, he does not satisfy it (“stillt”) (p. 290). The

\(^6\) Since many authors and historical events from very different periods are often quoted side by side, the
addition of a time chart would have been useful.
panegyrist Pacatus certainly does not “attack” (“greift [...] an” p. 305) the emperor’s achievements in his speech, but “moves on to them” or “treats” them (“geht über zu” or “befaßt sich mit”). Finally, I must confess that I failed to grasp the sense of “Nachlaß” in the sentence on p. 235 (fourth paragraph): “Jedem der [...] Studenten war ein Nachlaß des Meisters sicher”. “Every one of [Isocrates’] students could be sure to receive a discount from his master” (or “an inheritance”, “a remission”, “a bequest”?).

There are a few misprints and oversights. On p. 13, the word division should be Historiographie (not Historiog-raphie); on p. 21, delete the second “gibt”; on p. 34, read “genus iudiciale” (not “iudiciale”); on p. 51, read “ordnen [...] an” (not “auf”); on p. 72, the beginning of the famous Middle High German poem reads, according to modern editions, “du bist min, ich bin din” (not “ich bin [...]”); on p. 81, read “Prosopopöie” or “Prosopopoie” (the term is missing in the index); on p. 100 (second paragraph), add “bei” or “in” in “wenn sie bei jeder Verordnung”; on p. 175, read “kolakeia” for “kalokakeia”; on p. 235, read “alle” for “alle”; on p. 237, the correct name is “Martianus Capella” (not “Martinus”); on p. 272, read “Johann Ernesti”, not “Ernestis” (the name is spelled correctly, but listed with wrong initials in the bibliography, p. 319).

In the bibliography (pp. 315-322), Ps.-Longinus’s On the Sublime is listed under the heading “Demetrius” (p. 316); the translator of Hermogenes’ On Stases is R. Nadeau (not Nadeus) (p. 317), but this translation is now superseded by Heath 1995. The Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik is now planned to comprise ten volumes (p. 318); for Adamietz’ article in ANRW the page numbers are missing (2227-2271) (p. 318). It would be useful for readers to know the year of the first print of Curtius (that is, 1948 – p. 319, cf. also p. 268) and Norden (that is, 1909 and 1915, p. 321). The Latin counterpart of Ernesti’s book on Greek terminology should not be missing: Lexicon technologiae Latinorum rhetoricae, Leipzig 1797 (both reprinted in Hildesheim, 1962); Ernesti’s initials are J(ohann) C(hristian) T(heophil) (not J. C. G.) (p. 319). For Thucydides no text or translation is given (e.g. G. P. Landmann, Thucydidis, Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Krieges, München 1977). Since Andersen’s book addresses the general reader, German translations of some of the modern works could also have been quoted, e.g. for Clarke 1953, and for Eco, Marrou, and Perelman 1958.

There are a few factual inaccuracies (some of which may be due to the translation, cf. above). Thus, the explanation of hiatus (p. 71) is slightly misleading (it concerns the end and the beginning of two consecutive words). Hendiadyoin does not necessarily entail patterns of phonetic repetition (p. 80). Probably due to mistranslation is the dating of the development of the Greek alphabet to the seventh century BC (p. 95) (instead of at least to the eighth century BC). To understand the anecdote on p. 105 (second paragraph) it is necessary to add that Brutus had Crassus’s speeches recited. There were two (not one) treatises on rhetoric by Philodemos (one of which is rather lengthy, p. 189). The treatise The Education of Children, ascribed to Plutarch (p. 193), and the set of progymnasmata ascribed to Hermogenes (pp. 244f) are both now commonly regarded as spurious. In Plato’s Crito (p. 280) there is only one interlocutor (Kriton), not several (unless we count the prosopopoia of the Athenian Laws as interlocutors).

Despite these criticisms (some of which touch points beyond the author’s responsibility) Andersen adds a new distinctive voice to the chorus of introductions to rhetoric. His book is not designed for the reader who is looking for a ready reference work with lists of tropes or tables reducing the rhetorical system to an easily memorized set of Greek and Roman terms, or else for a full-scale sketch of the history of ancient rhetorical practice, or else for the evolution of the system of rhetoric (such a reader is better advised to look among the titles listed in Andersen’s bibliography or else among those cited in this review). Im Garten der Rhetorik is for the readers who want to hear the voices of ancient teachers of rhetoric or orators and who want to hear questions asked rather than answers given. For even where Andersen does not provide detailed in-depth analysis of the general aspects he addresses, he still provokes further investigation in the right
direction. In his concluding remark, Andersen leaves the door to his garden open for the reader to return (p. 308). Some readers might also, inspired by what they have seen, go out into nature and look for the original plants in their natural settings to understand fully the power and beauty of rhetoric.

List of works cited in the review

Manfred Kraus, s.v. ‘Enthymem’, in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* 2 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1994), coll. 1197-1222

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