40 Cases of Plagiarism

In mid-October 2009 Michael V. Dougherty contacted the Finnish copyright holders of Ilkka Kantola’s 1994 book *Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times* to inform them that he had found extensive *verbatim* plagiarism of Kantola’s book in an article by Martin W.F. Stone, published in 2000 in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales (RTPM)*. Upon learning, at the end of October 2009, of Dougherty’s finding, Pernille Harsting discovered that a 1999 article by Martin W.F. Stone, published in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, also contained extensive *verbatim* plagiarism of Kantola’s book. Complaints, based on these and further findings by Dougherty, Harsting and Russell L. Friedman, were sent, in the second week of November 2009, by the Finnish copyright holders to the editors of *RTPM*, requesting that the journal retract Martin W.F. Stone’s 2000 article, as well as to Martin W.F. Stone’s academic work places. In February 2010 an editorial note with the requested retraction was published in *RTPM* 76:2 (2009), v-vi. By that time, Dougherty, Harsting and Friedman had found plagiarism in 40 of Martin W.F. Stone’s publications (comprising journal articles, book chapters and encyclopedia entries). Since we firmly believe that plagiarism in scholarship must be disclosed and openly discussed, in this case not least in order to prevent the further dissemination of other researchers’ intellectual property under the name of Martin W.F. Stone, we were determined to publish our findings. We are grateful to the editor of the *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, Kent Emery, Jr., for supporting the publication of this Dossier; we are gratified that he considers plagiarism, as do we, to be a serious breach of scholarly ethics and a form of conduct that undermines the foundation of all that we endeavor to achieve in the world of learning.

The Dossier below contains 40 entries, documenting the plagiarism found in the 40 publications by Martin W.F. Stone that we have investigated. It is important to emphasize that the list is not exhaustive; it includes only the main plagiarized sources that we have identified and documented as of 24 March 2010. We would be grateful for all supplements to, and corrections of, our documentation.

Each entry includes (1) bibliographical information on the publication by Martin W.F. Stone; (2) bibliographical information on the main source(s) of the plagiarized text found in Martin W.F. Stone’s publication; (3) the page numbers on which the plagiarized text is found in Martin W.F. Stone’s publication, along with the corresponding page numbers on which the text in question is found in the original source; (4) one or more examples that illustrate the plagiarism. Please note that the bibliographical information in the 40 en-
tries has not been standardized. Instead, we have aimed at making the names of authors and editors as well as the titles of articles, journals and books mirror as precisely as possible the way they are rendered in the original publications, i.e., both Martin W.F. Stone’s publications and those he plagiarized. Please also note that the numerous plagiarized footnotes in Martin W.F. Stone’s publications are not listed separately but are tacitly included as a part of the plagiarized pages; plagiarism in endnotes in Martin W.F. Stone’s publications, on the other hand, is documented in the relevant entries.

In the entries we use the following general abbreviations:

“S 10” means “Stone, p. 10”
“S10” means “Stone, endnote 10”
“X 20 n. 4” means “Source X, note 4 on page 20”
“X 20 & n. 4” means “Source X, page 20 with note 4”
“X 20-21” indicates the plagiarism of an uninterrupted passage found on pages 20-21 in Source X
“S 10 = X 20-21” indicates that text found on page 10 in Martin W.F. Stone’s publication is copied from pages 20-21 in Source X.

In The New Oxford Dictionary of English, “plagiarism” is defined as “the practice of taking someone else’s work or ideas and passing them off as one’s own.”

The Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (where Martin W.F. Stone was employed until recently) states on its homepage: “K.U.Leuven defines plagiarism as follows: ‘Plagiarism is any identical or lightly-altered use of one’s own or someone else’s work (ideas, texts, structures, images, plans, etc.) without adequate reference to the source.’”

Taking our point of departure in these generally accepted definitions of plagiarism, in our documentation of the 40 plagiarism cases we have only included those occurrences of plagiarism in Martin W.F. Stone’s publications that answer to the most obvious and indisputable criterion, namely the unacknowledged copying of someone else’s published work and the publishing of it as one’s own. More specifically still, by ‘unacknowledged copying and publishing’ we mean the copying, verbatim or in a slightly altered form, of pas-

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3 In this specific context, “slightly altered form” refers, e.g., to Martin W.F. Stone’s writing “is” instead of “was”; occasionally using synonyms such as “cognisance” instead of “knowledge”, and “Thomas” instead of “Aquinas”, as well as a Greek or Latin word instead of its English equivalent; and occasionally making minor changes to the order of words or sentences.
sages of text written and published by others, and publishing this copied text under one’s own name, without indication of the dependence on the source. Following this criterion, in our documentation we have not included the examples in Martin W.F. Stone’s publications of unacknowledged paraphrasing of others’ published work. Furthermore, we have not registered the examples of unacknowledged use of standard translations, but only noted some of the places where Martin W.F. Stone claims authorship of standard translations and translations published in earlier works by other scholars.

In several cases Martin W.F. Stone leaves out any mention of the specific work(s) from which he plagiarizes. Generally, however, and as exemplified in entries 11, 15 and 26 below, in his footnotes Martin W.F. Stone mentions many of the works by other scholars that served as sources for his unacknowledged copying. However, in none of the instances listed in the 40 entries below does he indicate his debt to these sources, and, in particular, he never informs the reader that he is copying verbatim or nearly verbatim from them. Instead, he usually refers to the work in question at a different place, or for a different issue.

A particularly illuminating example of this practice of mentioning without acknowledging the source that he is copying from, is offered in Martin W.F. Stone’s article, “Initium omnis peccati est superbia”, from 2005 (see entry 24 below). After having copied, mostly verbatim, pages 126-131 of D. Catherine Brown, Pastor and laity in the theology of Jean Gerson, on pages 314-321 of his article, Martin W.F. Stone writes, on p. 321 (immediately after the last sentence copied verbatim from Brown’s book): “In an otherwise exemplary study, D. Catherine Brown asserts that...”. It is to be hoped that the argument of this paper casts doubt on this conclusion.” As it turns out, footnote 116, printed at the bottom of p. 321 in Martin W.F. Stone’s article, refers to the pages in Brown’s book that come immediately before and immediately after the pages copied verbatim by Martin W.F. Stone: “Brown, Pastor and Laity, 131. See also 118-23.”

As mentioned above, as a consequence of our discovery of this plagiarism, one article by Martin W.F. Stone (listed in entry 4 below) has already been retracted. Two further retractions will soon appear (of the articles listed in entries 3 and 29). In addition to the published retractions, the editors and publishers of these three articles have agreed that the articles will no longer be made available in a commercial electronic version, and that labels, stating the facts about the article’s retraction on account of plagiarism, will be sent to all

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4 That is, without quotation marks and an unambiguous reference to the original source, or without in some other way making clear to the reader the nature of the copying.
subscribers (with the request that they be placed on the first and the last page of the articles in question) and added to all hitherto unsold copies of the publications. We believe that these steps are indispensable in order to prevent this plagiarized material from being cited in the future. We therefore urge authors, editors and publishers—all those whose intellectual property rights and legal copyright have been infringed by this plagiarism—to request the retraction of the articles, book chapters and encyclopedia entries in which their work has been plagiarized.

Dossier of 40 Cases

Case 1 (1998)


S 269 = J 759b; S 270 = J 759b; S 271 = J 759b; S 272 = J 760a; S 273 = J 760a, 760b; S 274 = J 760b; S 275 = J 760b, 761a; S 276 = J 761a; S 277 = J 761a, 761b; S 278 = J 761b; S 279 = J 762a; S 280 = J 762a; S 283 = J 762b; S 284 = J 762b

(2) Alexander BROADE, The Shadow of Scotus. Philosophy and Faith in Pre-Reformation Scotland (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995) (= B)

S 276 = B 9; S 277 = B 9, 10


S 282 = G1 318, 319


S 285-286 = T 476


S 287 = Ta vii; S 288 = Ta viii

(6) Brian DAVIES, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) (= D1)

S 288 = D1 55-56; S 289 = D1 56, 57; S 290 = D1 57, 60; S 291 = D1 61; S 298 = D1 58, 59, 71; S 299 = D1 71; S 307 = D1 98; S 308 = D1 98, 99, 100


S 292 = C 255, 256

(8) Baruch A. BRODY, “Introduction”, in Readings in the Philosophy of Religion. An Analytic

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Dr. Danielle LAYNE contributed with the identification of most of the sources for this entry.
M.V. Dougherty, P. Harsting and R.L. Friedman

S 292-293 = Br 4

S 294 = M 41-42; S 302 = M 82, 85; S 303 = M 85, 86; S 304 = M 88, 92; S 305 = M 95-96, 97; S 306 = M 98, 99, 101

(10) John Cottingham, Descartes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) (= Co)
S 294-295 = Co 59

S 295 = Wo 106; S 296 = Wo 106-107

S 301 = Wi 113, 114

S 301 = Bl 364; S 302 = Bl 367

S 307 = G2 12

S 308 = Wie 12; S 313 = Wie 13, 14, 15-16; S 324 = Wie 202, 203, 204, 205, 207; S 325 = Wie 207, 208

S 314 = P 265a-265b; S 315 = P 265b, 266a, 266b; S 316 = P 246a; S 317 = P 246b, 247a; S 318 = P 247a, 247b; S 330 = P 296-297, 298; S 331 = P 298; S 332 = P 419a, 419b; S 339 = P 419b, 420a; S 340 = P 436a, 436b

S 320 = D2 103, 104, 106

(18) Paul Helm, “God and Spacelessness”, in Philosophy 55 (1980), pp. 211-221 (= He)
S 321 = He 211

S 322 = Sw 219-220; S 323 = Sw 220, 221

S 325 = Pi 1

S 326 = Ge 16-17, 20, 21; S 327 = Ge 21
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S 327 = R 18

S 327 = PHRB 104

S 336 = Z 5, 4; S 337 = Z 4

S 343 = Ti 77, 78; S 344 = Ti 79

S 345 = Wy 413; S 346 = Wy 420, 423; S 347 = Wy 424, 425, 424, 425 [sic]; S 348 = Wy 425, 426-427

EXAMPLES:

JORDAN, p. 761a: “After about 500 AD, philosophy is subsumed within the three monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, Islam. It is subsumed, not abolished. The most important thinkers of the three religions carried on teaching and wrote works that engaged the legacy of ancient philosophy powerfully and creatively. But they understood their teaching and their writing not as philosophy, but as the study of divine law, as interpretation of divine revelation, as the codification and clarification of religious traditions.”

STONE, p. 275: “After AD 400 philosophy became subsumed within the three monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The most important thinkers of these three religions carried on teaching and wrote works that substantively engaged with the legacy of ancient thought. But they understood their teaching and their writing not as philosophy per se, but as the study of divine law, as an interpretation of divine revelation, or as the codification and clarification of their own religious traditions.”

WIPPEL, p. 114: “The third way consists of two major steps and is based on the possible and the necessary. Step one begins with the observation that we experience things that are capable of existing and not existing since they are subject to generation and corruption.”

STONE, p. 301: “Of these arguments, the third way (tertia via) consists of two steps and is concerned with the modal notions of possibility and necessity. The first step begins with the observation that we experience things that are capable of existence and non-existence and are subject to generation and corruption.”

POJMAN, p. 246a: “For any proposition, God knows whether it is true or false. That is, all God’s beliefs are justified and true. He holds no false beliefs at all. Certain questions immediately arise from the notion of omniscience. For example, much of our descriptive or propositional knowledge depends on knowledge by acquaintance, experiential knowledge. But experiential knowledge is particular to the individual experiencer. I cannot experience your taste of chocolate ice cream or feel your headache, so how can God be said to know our experiences if they are ours?”
STONE, p. 316: “For any proposition, God knows whether it is true or false; that is, God’s beliefs are justified and true and God holds no false beliefs. Certain questions immediately arise from this definition. For example, some propositional knowledge depends upon experiential knowledge, but experiential knowledge is particular to an individual knower. If I cannot experience how your coffee tastes to you, for example, how can God be said to know our experiences if they are truly ours?”

SWINBURNE, pp. 219-220: “Thus my tie has changed if it was clean yesterday, but is not clean today. But although everything which ‘changes’ in the ordinary sense does seem to ‘change’ by the Cambridge criterion, the converse is not true.”

STONE, p. 322: “Thus my suit has changed if it was dry-cleaned yesterday but is not clean today. The point here is that everything which ‘changes’ in the real sense of that term does seem to change according to the Cambridge criterion but not vice versa.”

Case 2 (1998)


S 227b-228a = St 257b

EXAMPLE:

STARK, p. 257b: “In its narrowest sense, it refers to the use of subtle definitional distinctions in the handling of ethico-legal or purely ethical problems with the aim of drawing fine dividing lines between what is permissible and what is not. As this technique has at times been applied in order to excuse crimes and sins and to exculpate criminals and sinners....”

STONE, pp. 227b-228a: “In its narrowest sense, casuistry refers to the use of subtle definitional distinctions in the handling of the problems of moral theology, with the aim of drawing fine dividing lines between what is and is not permissible at the level of action. The technique has at times been used to excuse crimes and sins, thereby exculpating the immoral....”

Case 3 (1999)

M.W.F. STONE and T. VAN HOUDT, “Probabilism and Its Methods: Leonardus Lessius and his contribution to Jesuit casuistry”, in Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 75 (1999), pp. 359-394 (= S), plagiarizes:

(1) Ilkka KANTOLA, Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994) (= K)

S 371 = K 124, 125; S 372 = K 125-126, 127; S 373 = K 127, 128; S 374 = K 128-129; S 375 = K 129; S 376 = K 131-132; S 377 = K 132-133; S 378 = K 133, 134; S 379 = K 135-136, 137-138; S 380 = K 138-139; S 381 = K 139-140

EXAMPLE:

KANTOLA, pp. 128-129: “It is interesting that Medina considers that intersubjective or extrinsical probability, i.e. probability by authorities, also renders an opinion ‘safe’ (tuta). In the case that two contradicting probable opinions exist, both are, essentially speaking, safe; the more probable opinion is more safe, but this does not imply that the less probable one is not safe to a degree.”
STONE, p. 374: “Medina considers that intersubjective or extrinsic probability, i.e., probability based on authorities, also renders an opinion ‘safe’ (*tuta*). In a case in which two conflicting probable opinions exist, both are, essentially speaking, safe; the more probable opinion is safer but this does not imply that the less probable opinion is not ‘safe’ to some degree.”

**Case 4 (2000)**

Martin W.F. STONE, “The origins of probabilism in late scholastic thought: a prolegomenon to further study”, in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 67 (2000), pp. 114-157 (= S), plagiarizes:

   
   S 117 = M 136

   
   S 118 = K 15-16; S 119 = K 16, 26, n. 4, 27; S 120 = K 27-28; S 121 = K 28, 29, 30; S 122 = K 30-31, 58; S 123 = K 60-61; S 124 = K 61, 65-66; S 125 = K 66, 67; S 128 = K 79, 80; S 129 = K 80-81, 85, n. 4, 85-86; S 130 = K 86, 87-88; S 131 = K 90-91; S 132 = K 91-92, 93; S 133 = K 93-94; S 134 = K 94-95; S 135 = K 95-97; S 136 = K 97-98; S 137 = K 101-102; S 138 = K 103; S 139 = K 103-105; S 140 = K 105, 106; S 141 = K 106-108; S 142 = K 108; S 143 = K 109; S 144 = K 112; S 145 = K 112; S 146 = K 112-113; S 147 = K 113, 114; S 148 = K 114, 115; S 149 = K 116-117; S 150 = K 117-118; S 151 = K 118-119; S 152 = K 119-120; S 153 = K 121; S 154 = K 122

   
   S 127 n. 35 = P 19

**EXAMPLES:**

KANTOLA, p. 30: “Another 13th century writer, Boethius of Dacia, is more explicit when presenting this kind of justification in respect to the notion of probability as approvability by qualified authorities. In the third book of his *Quaestiones super librum Topicorum*, Boethius of Dacia lays down some rules of thumb that help one to judge what is the best alternative in some problematic situations. Boethius of Dacia says, among other things, that if we have to choose between a *unanimous opinion of experts* and an opinion opposite to it, it is better to follow the opinion of the experts. This is the case because it is *probable* that a unanimous opinion of the experts is true.”

STONE, p. 121: “Another thirteenth-century philosopher Boethius of Dacia (fl. 1260) is even more explicit in respect to the notion of probability as approvability by the authorities. In the third book of his *Quaestiones super librum Topicorum*, he provides a series of guidelines to help one judge what is the best alternative in some problematic situations. Among other things, Boethius of Dacia holds that if we have to choose between the unanimous opinion of experts and an opinion opposite to it, it is better to follow the opinion of the experts. This is the case because it is probable that such an opinion is true....”

KANTOLA, p. 108: “For the purpose of this study, it is interesting that Buridan’s analysis of will is considerably concentrated on the question of the certainty of deliberation. As long as the result of practical consideration is uncertain, it is possible that a person prefers further deliberation.”
For the purposes of this paper, it is interesting that Buridan’s analysis of the will is concentrated on the question of the certainty of deliberation. He is of the view that as long as a practical consideration is uncertain, it is possible that our *voluntas* will recommend further deliberation.”

**Case 5 (2000)**


   **Main text:** S 36 = D 4-5, 13, 15, 16, 19; S 37 = D 19, 20, 45, 46. **Endnotes:** S9 = D 5 n. 7; S13 = D 13 n. 1; S14 = D 13 n. 3; S15-16 = D 15 nn. 8-9; S17 = D 16 n. 11; S19 = D 16 & n. 12; S20 = D 17 n. 14; S21 = D 15-16 & n. 10; S22 = D 25 & n. 31; S23 = D 29, 30 & n. 45; S24 = D 35, 31 & nn. 48-49; S25 = D 36 & n. 60, n. 63; S26 = D 38, 41 n. 75; S41 = D 10; S86 = D 121, 127 & n. 12, n. 25


   S 38 = MS 407b


   **Main text:** S 38-39 = FvS 31-32; S 41 = FvS 33-34; S 42 = FvS 34, 35, 36-37; S 43 = FvS 37-38, 38-39; S 44 = FvS 39-40, 41, 42; S 46 = FvS 45-46, 44, 46-47; S 47 = FvS 47, 48-49; S 48 = FvS 49, 50-51, 52; S 49 = FvS 52-53, 54, 55-56; S 50 = FvS 56-57, 59, 60 & n. 9; S 51 = FvS 60-61, 61-62; S 52 = FvS 62, 63-64. **Endnotes:** S65 = FvS n. 3; S71 = FvS 38; S98-99 = FvS 51


   S 39 = B 325a; S 40 = B 325a-b


   S 39 = Sh 171b; S 40 = Sh 171b-172a


   **Main text:** S 40-41 = Ba 103-105. **Endnotes:** S49-54 = Ba nn. 22-27; S55-56 = Ba n. 29; S57-60 = Ba nn. 31-34


   **Main text:** S 45 = W 14, 15; S 52 = W 15; S 53 = W 41, 42-43, 44; S 54 = W 44, 45, 46, 47, 48; S 55 = W 48, 51-52. **Endnotes:** S85 = W n. 27; S110-111 = W n. 29; S116 = W 41 & n. 99; S117 = W n. 100; S122 = W 45-46 & n. 109; S124-125 = W nn. 111-112; S127, 129 = W n. 120
EXAMPLES:
DALES, p. 10: “And in *De generatione animalium* 2, 3 (736a), after discussing how the matter supplied by the mother is formed by the vital heat supplied by the father so that first the vegetative soul, having existed potentially in the semen, comes into being actually, and the sensitive soul similarly comes into actual being after having existed potentially in the vegetative, Aristotle concludes that the intellective soul cannot have been generated internally. ‘It remains,’ he says, ‘that the intellect...’.”
STONE, p. 61, n. 41: “After discussing how the matter supplied by the mother is formed by the vital heat supplied by the father so that first the vegetative soul, having existed potentially in the semen, comes into being actually, and the sensitive soul similarly comes into actual being after having existed potentially in the vegetative, Aristotle concludes that the intellective soul cannot have been generated internally. He says, ‘It remains, then, that the intellect...’.”
WIPPEL, p. 41: “We have some knowledge of this work owing to the testimony of the Renaissance philosopher, Agostino Nifo. Insofar as we can judge from the excerpts and references given by Nifo, in this treatise Siger’s thought on the human intellect had developed somewhat, but in it he still defended unicity of the possible intellect.” [Note 99, p. 97: “On this see B. Nardi, *Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del rinascimento italiano* (Rome, 1945), especially pp. 17-24, 46-47.”]
STONE, p. 68, n. 116: “We have some knowledge of this work owing to the testimony of the Renaissance philosopher, Agostino Nifo (1469/1470-1538). In this treatise, Siger’s thought had developed somewhat although he still defended the unicity of the intellect. See B. Nardi, *Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del rinascimento italiano* (Roma: Edizioni Italiana, 1945), pp. 17-24, and 46-7.”

Case 6 (2000)
Main text: S 29 = L 216; S 30 = L 216-217, 224, 226; S 31 = L 226, 227; S 32 = L 229; S 33 = L 230. Endnotes: S11 = L 219-221 & n. 12
Main text: S 32 = J 484 & n. 5; S 33 = J 485; S 34 = J 483-484; S 35 = J 484-485 & nn. 9-10, n. 12; S 36 = J 485-486 & n. 15, n. 18; S 37 = J 486-487 & nn. 20-23; S 38 = J 487-488 & n. 24; S 39 = J 488 & n. 26; S 40 = J 488-489 & nn. 29-33; S 41 = J 488-489 & nn. 36-39; S 42 = J 490-491 & n. 40, n. 44; S 43 = J 491-492 & nn. 48-49, nn. 52-53; S 44 = J 492-493 & n. 54; S 45 = J 493-494 & nn. 63-64; S 46 = J 494-495. Endnotes: S1 = J n. 1; S6 = J n. 3; S28 = J n. 7; S39 = J n. 14; S40 = J n. 17; S42 = J n. 27; S43 = J n. 28; S45 = J n. 34; S46 = J n. 35; S47 = J n. 46; S50 = J n. 51; S51 = J n. 55; S52 = J n. 56; S53 = J n. 58; S54 = J n. 60; S55 = J n. 61; S56 = J n. 62
EXAMPLES:
LINDBERG, p. 217: “Various documents address the fate of Aristotle’s works during the next twenty-five years. They reveal that the bans of 1210, 1215, and 1231 were partially successful for a time, but that they began to lose their effectiveness around 1240. One reason for this may have been Gregory IX’s death in 1241...; another may have been a growing awareness among the Parisian masters of arts that they were losing ground (and reputation) to their counterparts at Oxford....”
STONE, p. 30: “Other documents address the fortunes of Aristotle’s works at this time. They reveal that while the bans of 1210, 1215, and 1235 were moderately successful, they began to lose their effectiveness around 1240. One reason for this may have been Gregory’s death in 1241, while another may have been the growing awareness among the Parisian masters that they were losing ground to their colleagues in Oxford....”
JORDAN, p. 495: “I noted at several points that his language becomes heavily charged whenever he describes the ascent to the top of the hierarchy. The pertinent passages of On the Intellect are filled with lyrical quotations from potent authorities, and the corresponding parts of other treatises repeat these or tell affecting stories of philosophical seeking. In the Summa, the reader is given a doctrine about the rhetorical character of theology. Because theology makes explicit the teleology of the ascent, and because it offers the only sure way of ascending, theological language must be variously persuasive. So too are Albert’s remarks on the hierarchy of sciences.”
STONE, p. 46: “I have noted at several points above that Albert’s language becomes heavily charged whenever he describes the ascent to the top of the hierarchy. The pertinent passages of De intellectu are filled with lyrical quotations from numerous auctoritates: Pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine, Apuleius, to name but a few, and the corresponding parts of the other treatises repeat these remarks. In the Summa, the reader is given a doctrine about the rhetorical charter [sic] of theology. Because theology makes explicit the teleology of ascent, and because it offers the only sure way of ascending, theological language must be variously persuasive. So too are Albert’s remarks on the hierarchy of the sciences.”

Case 7 (2000)\(^6\)

Main text: S 61 = DS 10, 11, 12; S 62 = DS 12, 14-15; S 63 = DS 15, 16, 17, 18; S 64 = DS 21, 23-24; S 65 = DS 29-30; S 66 = DS 32; S 67 = DS 32-33; S 68 = DS 33-35; S 69 = DS 35-36; S 70 = DS 36-37; S 71 = DS 37-38; S 72 = DS 38-39; S 73 = DS 39-40, 20; S 74 = DS 20-21 & n. 49; S 75 = DS 41-42; S 76 = DS 42-43. Endnotes: S16 = DS n. 1; S18-19 = DS nn. 4-5; S20 = DS n. 9; S22 = DS nn. 13-14; S24 = DS n. 15; S25 = DS nn. 16-17; S26 = DS n. 18; S27 = DS 15-16 & nn. 21-22, nn. 24-25; S30 = DS n. 26; S31 = DS n. 32; S32 = DS n. 31; S33 = DS n. 33; S34 = DS n. 52; S35 = DS n. 62; S36 = DS n. 63; S38 = DS 29; S40 = DS n. 80, n. 83; S41 = DS n. 81; S42 = DS 32 & n. 82; S43 = DS 32; S44 = DS 33; S45-48 = DS 33; S49 = DS n.

\(^6\) The editor of Calvin Theological Journal, Arie LEDER, made us aware, in February 2010, of the plagiarism of Donald SINNEMA’s article.
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88; S50 = DS 34; S51 = DS n. 89; S52 = DS n. 90; S53 = DS 34-35; S54 = DS n. 91; S55-56 = DS 35; S57 = DS 35-36; S58-59 = DS 36; S61 = DS n. 94; S62-63 = DS 37; S64-68 = DS 38; S69-73 = DS 39; S74 = DS n. 45; S75 = DS 20 & n. 46; S76 = DS n. 48; S77 = DS n. 49; S80 = DS n. 97; S81 = DS n. 98; S82 = DS n. 99; S83 = DS n. 102; S84 = DS n. 104; S85 = DS n. 107


Main text: S 77 = JT 153, 154, 155; S 78 = JT 155, 324, 325. Endnotes: S11 = JT 120; S89 = JT 373 n. 5; S90 = JT 132, 133; S91 = JT 373 n. 6, 150

EXAMPLE:

SINNEMA, p. 11: “Faced with the pressing need for curriculum materials in the new Protestant schools, Melanchthon wrote textbooks for many of the disciplines, including ethics. These tended to be compendia of Aristotle’s works, corrected and supplemented at points by the truths of biblical revelation. During the course of his career, Melanchthon lectured on Aristotle’s Ethics at least eight times, beginning in 1527-28.4" [Note 4: “Karl Hartfelder, Philipp Melanchthon als Praeceptor Germaniae (Berlin: A. Hofmann, 1889), pp. 558-65.”]

STONE, p. 61: “Faced with the pressing need for curriculum materials in the new Protestant schools and universities, Melanchthon wrote textbooks for many disciplines including ethics. These tended to be compendia of Aristotle’s works, corrected and supplemented at points by the assumed verities of biblical revelation. During the course of his career, Melanchthon lectured on Aristotle’s Ethics at least eight times, beginning in 1527-28.18" [Endnote 18: “K. Hartfelder, Philipp Melanchthon als Praeceptor Germaniae, Berlin, A. Hoffmann, 1889, pp. 558-65.”]

Case 8 (2000)

Martin STONE, “Response”, in Referring to God: Jewish and Christian Philosophical and Theological Perspectives, ed. Paul HELM (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 120-128 (= S), plagiarizes:

(1) Colette SIRAT, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) (= Si)
S 121 = Si 33; S 122 = Si 33, 34; S 123 = Si 34

S 126 = P 393, 394

EXAMPLE:

PETERSON, p. 394: “The underlying strategy is this: in order to show that two propositions p and q are consistent, one must find a third proposition r which is consistent with p and, conjoined with p, entails q. This would show that p and q are possibly true together. Hence, in order to rebut the alleged inconsistency, Plantinga’s approach is to find a proposition whose conjunction with (1) is consistent and entails (2). He carefully argues that it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for creating a world containing moral evil.”

STONE, p. 126: “The underlying strategy he adopted was to argue that in order to show that two propositions p and q are consistent, one must find a third proposition r which is consistent with p and, conjoined with p, entails q. Such a proposition would show that p and q are possibly true together. Hence in order to rebut the inconsistency though [sic] to exist by holding (1) and (2) together, Plantinga’s approach is to find a proposition whose conjunction with (1) is consistent
and entails (2). So he argues that it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for creating a world containing moral evil...."

Case 9 (2001)


S 798 = D 300, 301, 302, 303; S 799 = D 303, 304, 305, 307, 308, 322; S 800 = D 322, 323, 324, 325, 328, 329

(2) Ilkka Kantola, Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994) (= K)
S 801 = K 79; S 802 = K 79-80; S 803 = K 80-81; S 804 = K 81-82; S 805 = K 85-86; S 806 = K 86, 87-88, 90-91; S 807 = K 91-92; S 808 = K 93-94; S 809 = K 94; S 815 = K 95; S 816 = K 95-96; S 817 = K 96-98, 102, 101; S 818 = K 101-102

S 802 = St 593

S 809 = T 62; S 810 = T 62-63 & nn. 1-2, n. 4; S 811 = T 63-64 & n. 9; S 812 = T 64-66; S 813 = T 66, 69; S 814 = T 69-70

S 819 = I 94, 95 & n. 5, n. 9; S 820 = I 96-97 & n. 13, n. 15; S 821 = I 97-98 & nn. 18-19, n. 21; S 822 = I 98, 99-100 & n. 22, n. 20, n. 24; S 823 = I 100-101 & n. 25, n. 27; S 824 = I 101 & n. 23

EXAMPLES:
Teske, p. 64: “There are at least three passages in which William develops the image of the will as king and ruler. In De anima he maintains that the will has the power of command (imperium) and “cannot be prevented against its will from its proper operation, which is to will.” The concupiscible and irascible powers that we share with animals....”
Stone, p. 811: “...there are, to my knowledge, at least two passages in which he deploys the image of the will as king or ruler. In his “De anima” William argues that the will has the power of command (imperium) and “cannot be prevented against its will from its proper activity, which is to will”. The concupiscible and irascible powers of the soul that humans share with animals....”

7 William O. Duba contributed to the identification of sources for this entry.
INGHAM, p. 101: “The Scotist portrait of the eternal lawgiver echoes biblical imagery and presents divine freedom under an innovative human model: the free, rational legislator. This dynamic image portrays divine freedom as an ongoing reality. Divine posse is potest, not potuit: it is not a question of what God could do or could have done, but what He can indeed do now.”

STONE, pp. 823-824: “Scotus’s portrayal of the eternal lawgiver clearly resembles biblical imagery and presents divine freedom through the model of a free and rational legislator. Such an image depicts divine freedom as an ongoing reality. Divine posse is potest not potuit, it is not a matter of what God could do or could have done, but what He can do now.”

Case 10 (2001)


S 100 n. 12 = B 7; S 126 = B 19
S 102-103 = M1 161-162, 163, 162; S 104 = M1 162, 163
S 104 = Bo 103
S 105 n. 26 = K 11
(5) Michael Bertram CROWE, The changing profile of the natural law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977) (= C)
S 105 = C 184; S 106 = C 184; S 112 = C 183, 179-180 & nn. 45-47; S 113 = C 183-184; S 114 = C 184-185; S 115 = C 185, 186; S 116 = C 186; S 117 = C 186-187; S 118 = C 187, 188; S 120 = C 188; S 121 = C 189, 189; S 122 = C 189; S 124 = C 189, 190; S 125 = C 190
S 106 = M2 38-39; S 107 = M2 39-40
S 107 = N 106; S 108 = N 106, 107; S 109 = N 107; S 118 = N 41; S 119 = N 41-42; S 120 = N 42-43
(8) R.A. ARMSTRONG, Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) (= A)
S 111 = A 165, 166
(9) Joseph BOYLE, “Natural Law and Ethics of Traditions”, in Natural Law Theory: Contempo-
**M.V. Dougherty, P. Harsting and R.L. Friedman**

S 115 n. 45 = Boy 23, 26

S 122 & n. 65 = Ni 55-56

**EXAMPLES:**

McInerny, *Aquinas on Human Action*, pp. 161-162: “No less a scholar than René Antoine Gauthier, editor and translator (with Jean Yves Jolif) of the *L’Ethique à Nicomaque* and editor of the critical Leonine edition of St. Thomas’s *Sententiae super libros Ethicorum* insists that St. Thomas must be put in the forefront of those who did violence to Aristotle’s thought by forcing it into the Procrustean bed of Christian theology. If Gauthier is right, then the Aristotelianism found in Thomas can be of interest only to theologians. Aristotelians, and indeed historians of philosophy, would have to recognize it as an abuse of Aristotel for purposes unshared by the Stagirite.”

Stone, pp. 102-103: “...no less a scholar than René Antoine Gauthier O.P., joint author with Jean Yves Jolif O.P. of the acclaimed French translation and commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and editor of the critical Leonine edition of Thomas’s *Sententiae super libros Ethicorum* (Commentary on Aristotle’s *Ethics*). Gauthier insists that Thomas must be at the forefront of those who have done most violence to Aristotle’s thought by forcing it into the Procrustean bed of Christian theology. If Gauthier is right, then the ‘Aristotelianism’ found in Thomas’s work can only be of peripheral interest to theologians, as historians of philosophy would have to recognize Thomas’s appropriation as an abuse of Aristotle for purposes unshared by the Stagirite.”

Crowe, p. 185: “This being so, it is little wonder that there should exist great differences between the morals of one society and another. St. Thomas instances the Germans in Caesar’s *De bello gallico* who did not consider theft unlawful “although it expressly contradicts the natural law” and the morals castigated by St. Paul in the first chapter of his *Epistle to the Romans*. Such moral variations do not involve a denial of the natural law; they are due to the complexity with which the natural law is faced, to the corruption of human nature that takes advantage of that complexity....”

Stone, pp. 114-115: “This being so, it is hardly surprising that there should exist great differences between the morals of one society and another. Thomas instances the Germans in Caesar’s *De Bello Gallico*, Book VI, 23, who did not consider brigandage unlawful ‘although it expressly contradicts the natural law’, and the morals castigated by St. Paul in the first chapter of his *Epistle to the Romans*. Such moral variations do not involve a denial of the natural law; they are due to the complexity with which the natural law is faced, to the corruption of human nature that takes advantage of that complexity....”

**Case 11 (2001)**


S 255 = J 561b; S 256 = J 561b-562a; S 257 = J 562a, 562b; S 258 = J 562b, 563a; S 259 = J
40 Cases of Plagiarism

563a; S 260 = J 563b, 564a; S 261 = J 564a (*)

Main text: S 255-256 = C 59; S 259 = C 59-60; S 262 = C 65. Endnotes: S2 = C 58

S 258 = B 351b

S 258 = I 209a

S 260 = O 90; S 261 = O 90-91

S 261-262 = Sa 563a

EXAMPLES:

JORDAN, p. 562b: “They understood Augustine to teach that God had inserted into matter, at the moment of creation, intelligible patterns that could be actualized over time. So, for example, Bonaventure holds that the souls of non-rational animals and of plants were created not out of nothing nor simply out of some pre-existing matter, but rather ‘in the manner of a seed’. They were created, in other words, by actualizing an active potency in matter, which serves as a ‘seed bed’ of such potencies. After the moment of creation, animal souls are reproduced without divine intervention by the natural actualization of such ‘seed-like reasons’."

STONE, p. 258: “They understood Augustine to teach that God had infused into matter, at the moment of creation, intelligible patterns that could be actualized over time. Bonaventure, for example, held that the souls of non-rational animals and of plants were created not ex nihilo and not simply out of pre-existing matter, but rather in the manner of a seed. In other words, these souls were created by actualizing an active potency in matter. After the moment of creation, animal souls were reproduced without divine intervention by the natural actualization of these “seminal reasons”.”

(*) [STONE, endnote 1, p. 263: “The very same point is made by Jordan (1998).... I am grateful to Eleonore Stump for drawing my attention to Jordan’s article. The present study was written before I became acquainted with this intelligent paper.”]

OCKER, p. 91: “Although Gregory could call the cooperation of the human will with this special, additional influence a “coefficiency,” he did not believe that the auxilium speciale effected a moral and spiritual restoration of fallen human nature. Even under the reforming influence of spiritual grace, the will is unable to love God above all else.”

STONE, p. 261: “Although Gregory could call the co-operation of the human will with this special additional influence a “coefficiency,” he did not hold that the auxilium speciale effected a moral and spiritual restoration of fallen human nature. Even under the reforming aspect of spiritual grace, the will is unable to love God above all else.”

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Case 12 (2001)


S 80 = J 394b-395a; S 81 = J 395a

S 82 = K1 251-252 n. 68, 296; S 83 = K1 296-297; S 84 = K1 298

S 84 = K2 131; S 85 = K2 131, 133; S 86 = K2 133-134; S 87 = K2 134-135; S 88 = K2 135-136

S 89 = D 99; S 90 = D 99-100, 101; S 91 = D 101-102; S 92 = D 102-103; S 93 = D 103-105; S 94 = D 105-106

S 95-96 = MS 407b

S 96 = FvS 31-32; S 98 = FvS 34, 35, 38; S 99 = FvS 38-39, 40, 43, 48; S 100 = FvS 48-49, 50; S 101 = FvS 51, 54, 55-56; S 102 = FvS 56-57, 63-64; S 103 = FvS 64

S 97 = Ba 104-105; S 98 = Ba 105

EXAMPLE:

BAZÁN, p. 105: “This definition of the soul as form of the body is analogical; it allows for only an imperfect understanding of the different kinds of soul (diminute facit cognoscere), and, consequently, requires specific adjustments for each level of life, vegetative, sensitive and human.”

STONE, p. 97: “It is important to note that this definition of the soul as the form of the body is analogical; it allows for only an imperfect understanding of the different kinds of soul (diminute facit cognoscere), and consequently, requires specific adjustments for each level of life, vegetative, sensitive, and human.”

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Case 13 (2002)


S 10 = MS 405b, 406a, 406b; S 11 = MS 406b; S 13-15 = MS 407b, 408a-b, 409a-410a

S 11-12 = M 219-220

S 12 = L 289, 290-291, 293; S 13 = L 295

S 15 = K 514, 515

S 21-22 = A 387a-b

EXAMPLE:

Mahoney and South, pp. 408b-409a: “While those who read Alexander and Simplicius would have found the human soul to be many, that is, one soul for each human being, the interpretation of Averroes was quite different. The theory of the human soul that emerged from Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘On the Soul’ was that each human being had an individual sensitive soul and a set of internal senses that were numerically distinct in each human being. On the other hand, there was numerically only one intellect for the entire human race, and that intellect served as the ‘intellective soul’ for each human being.”

Stone, p. 13: “While those Aristotelians who read Alexander and Simplicius would have found the human soul to be many, that is, one soul for each human being, the interpretation of Averroës was quite different. His theory set out in his Long Commentary on Aristotle On the Soul was that each human being had an individual sensitive soul and a set of internal senses that were numerically distinct in each human being. On the other hand, there was numerically only one intellect for the entire human race, and this intellect served as an “intellective soul” for each human being.”

Case 14 (2002)

M.W.F. Stone, “Practical Reason and the Orders of Morals and Nature in Aquinas’s Theory of the Lex Naturae”, in Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytical Traditions,
M.V. Dougherty, P. Harsting and R.L. Friedman

ed. John Haldane (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), pp. 195-212 (= S), plagiarizes:


Main text: S 196 = St 113; S 197 = St 114-115; S 198 = St 115; S 199-203 = St 115-121; S 204 = St 121-122, 122-123; S 205-207 = St 123-126. Endnotes: S4 = St 113; S5 = St n. 2, n. 1; S6-7 = St nn. 2-3; S9-24 = St nn. 4-19; S26-28 = St nn. 21-23; S30-31 = St nn. 26-27; S33-37 = St nn. 28-32; S39 = St n. 33; S41-42 = St nn. 34-35; S43-48 = St nn. 37-42; S50 = St n. 44

EXAMPLE:

Steel, p. 122: “However, here again it must be emphasized that this ‘object’ is not the objective or the external act taken in itself, in its own nature, but only insofar as it involves a certain relation to reason. As examples of such acts, which are evil from the lack of ‘suitable object’, Thomas cites tollere aliena (to take what belongs to another)...."

Stone, p. 204: “Here again it must be stressed that the ‘object’ under discussion is not the external act taken in itself, but a certain relation to reason. As examples of such acts, which are evil for lack of a suitable object, Thomas cites tollere aliena (taking what belongs to another)...."


S 205 = T 6, 7; S 206 = T 7; S 207 = T 8-9; S 208 = T 9; S 217 = T 9, 10; S 218 = T 10-11; S 219 = T 11-12; S 220 = T 12, 13-14; S 221 = T 14-15; S 222 = T 15; S 223 = T 16, 17, 18; S 224 = T 18-19; S 225 = T 19-20

(2) Ilkka Kuntola, Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994) (= K)

S 206 = K 85-86; S 207 = K 86; S 208 = K 86, n. 8, 87-88; S 209 = K 88, n. 14; S 210 = K 79; S 211 = K 79-80; S 212 = K 80-81, 82; S 213 = K 90-91, n. 29, 91; S 214 = K 91-92; S 215 = K 92, 93-94; S 216 = K 94, 92


S 210 = St 593

EXAMPLE:

Stump, p. 593: “For Aquinas, human freedom depends on human cognitive capacities and on the connection of the will to those capacities. Consequently, as long as human acts of will originate in those faculties, those acts count as voluntary and free, even if the agent couldn’t have done otherwise in the circumstances or the act of will is necessitated by natural inclinations of intellect and will.”
STONE, p. 210: “For this reason, *liberum arbitrium* for Thomas will depend on human cognitive capacities, such as choice or *electio*, and on the connection of the will to those capacities. Accordingly, as long as human acts of will originate in those faculties, such acts will be ‘voluntary’ and ‘free,’ even if the agent could not have done otherwise in those circumstances, or the act of volition was necessitated by certain natural inclinations of intellect and will.” [Here Stone inserts n. 29, which has a reference to Stump’s article, but not to p. 593: “This aspect of Thomas’s discussion is brought out in convincing and attractive detail by E. Stump in “Aquinas’s Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will,” in *The Monist*, 80 (1979) [sic], pp. 576-597, esp. 587-592.”]

**Case 16 (2004)**


*Main text*: S 103 = Q 41, 42; S 104 = Q 42, 45, 46; S 105 = Q 46, 48, 49; S 106 = Q 50, 51, 52; S 107 = Q 52, 53; S 108 = Q 53, 54; S 109 = Q 54 & n. 37, 55 & n. 38; S 110 = Q 55, 56. *Endnotes*: S34 = Q n. 7; S35 = Q n. 10; S38 = Q n. 18; S42 = Q n. 21; S43 = Q n. 21; S44 = Q n. 26; S53 = Q n. 34; S54 = Q n. 35; S56 = Q n. 36; S59 = Q n. 37; S61-62 = Q n. 38


*Main text*: S 110 = R 660-661; S 111 = R 661, 668-669; S 112 = R 669. *Endnotes*: S67 = R n. 23; S68 = R n. 24, n. 22; S69 = R n. 25; S70 = R n. 27; S71 = R n. 28

**EXAMPLE:**

QUINN, p. 54: “When judging according to the eternal law, human reason does not err, for this is the noblest act of the superior reason. It can err by deviating from that law and attending inordinately to the good of the soul, or by allowing the inferior reason to seek inordinately the good of the sense appetites by ignoring the natural instinct of *synderesis*. Human reason is always right in its moral judgments only when consulting the eternal law from which it receives the rules or first principles of moral truth, i.e., of natural law. In applying those rules to particular actions, reason needs the direction of moral virtue.”

STONE, pp. 108-109: “When judging according to the eternal law human reason does not err. For this is the noblest act of superior reason. It can err, however, by deviating from that law and attending inordinately to the good identified by the sensory appetites and corporeal inclinations which in effect entails bypassing the natural instinct of *synderesis*. Human reason is correct in its moral judgements only when it effectively consults and understands the requirements of the eternal law, a body of knowledge that it can come to know by means of the first principles of practical reason or the natural law. Should reason then attempt to apply these rules to the level of action, it needs to be policed and thoroughly conditioned by the dispositions of moral virtue.”
Case 17 (2004)

S 279 = D 18, 19-20; S 280 = D 20

S 281 = F 335, 341, 350; S 282 = F 341

S 281 = F 335, 341, 350; S 282 = F 341

(4) G.R. Evans, Getting It Wrong: The Medieval Epistemology of Error (Leiden: Brill, 1998) (= E)
S 282 = E 199; S 283 = E 200

(5) Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1994) (= C)
S 284 = C 512-513; S 285 = C 513

S 286 = Sm 280-281, 282; S 287 = Sm 282

(7) John F. Quinn, “Bonaventure and our Natural Obligation to Confess the Truth”, in Franciscan Studies 35 (1975), pp. 194-211 (= Q)
S 294= Q 205; S 295 = Q 205, 206

S 307 = G 154-155; S 308 = G 155-156

S 314 = Fa 81; S 315= Fa 81, 82; S 316 = Fa 83-84

EXAMPLE:
Gelber, p. 156: “What Ockham seems to mean here is that someone who lies, first judges that proposition “p” is false, then asserts “p” in spoken form, and finally understands that the spoken proposition is false. Although as a proffered lie, the proposition “p” exists without an assertion of its falsity, yet in the process of lying, “p” never exists in mental language without such an assessment. What distinguishes knowledge about a lie from knowledge about other false propositions is that it is knowledge that a particular spoken sentence is false. A concept corresponding to the words “hoc verbum” represents the spoken lie in the mind, rather than the proposition exactly as spoken with its implicit implication of being true.”
STONE, p. 308: “By this Ockham intends that someone who lies, first judges the proposition \( p \) is false, then asserts \( p \) in spoken form, and finally understands that the spoken proposition is false. As an uttered lie, the proposition \( p \) exists without an assertion of its falsity, yet in the process of lying, \( p \) never exists in mental language without such an assessment. Seen thus, what distinguishes cognisance about a lie from knowledge of other false propositions is that it is knowledge that a particular spoken sentence is false. A concept corresponding to the words *hoc verbum* represents the spoken lie in the mind, rather than the proposition exactly as spoken with its implicit implication of being true.”

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**Case 18 (2004)**


(1) Ilkka KANTOLA, *Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times* (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994) (= K)

Main text: S 6 = K 124-125; S 7 = K 125-126, 126-127; S 8 = K 127-128; S 9 = K 128-129; S 10 = K 131; S 11 = K 131-132, 133, 134; S 12 = K 134-135; S 13 = K 135-137; S 14 = K 137-140; S 15 = K 140. *Endnotes*: S26-28 = K 124 nn. 1-3; S29 = K 125 n. 4; S30-31= K 125 nn. 6-7; S32-33 = K 126 nn. 8-9; S35-36 = K 126 nn. 10-11; S37 = K 127 n. 13; S39 = K 127 n. 14; S40 = K 128 n. 15; S43 = K 128 n. 16; S44-46 = K 129 nn. 17-19; S51-53 = K 131 nn. 1-3; S54-56 = K 132 nn. 4-6; S57-59 = K 133 nn. 7-9; S60-61 = K 134 nn. 11-12; S62-64 = K 135 nn. 14-15; S65-68 = K 136 nn. 17-20; S70-71 = K 137 nn. 25-26; S72-74 = K 138 nn. 28-30; S75 = K 139 n. 31; S77 = K 139 n. 32; S78 = K 140 n. 33; S80 = K 140 n. 34

**Example**:

KANTOLA, p. 135: “However, when there is reasonable doubt of some fact upon which one’s moral decision depends, this doubt does not make the question about that fact irrelevant or indifferent. Doubt in relation to fact must always be taken very seriously.”

STONE, p. 12: “When, however, there is reasonable doubt of some fact upon which one’s moral decision depends, this doubt does not make the question about that fact irrelevant or indifferent. Doubt in relation to fact, Suárez emphasises, must always be taken very seriously.”

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**Case 19 (2004)**


(1) Jaime FERNÁNDEZ-CASTAÑEDA, S.J., “Right reason in Francis Suarez”, in *The Modern Schoolman* 45 (1968), pp. 105-122 (= F-C)

S 39 = F-C 106, 107, 108; S 40 = F-C 108-109; S 41 = F-C 109-110, 111; S 42 = F-C 111, 112; S 43 = F-C 112; S 44 = F-C 112-113; S 45 = F-C 113, 115; S 46 = F-C 115

(2) Ilkka KANTOLA, *Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times* (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994) (= K)

S 47 = K 131; S 48 = K 131-132; S 49 = K 132-133; S 50 = K 133, 134; S 51 = K 134-135; S
EXAMPLE:
FERNÁNDEZ-CASTAÑEDA, p. 113: “Following St. Thomas, Suarez equates the actual judgments of right reason with natural law because right reason, as it was defined above, ‘lays commands or prohibitions upon the human will regarding what must be done as a matter of natural law [ex naturali jure].’ After a series of proofs from Scripture and the Fathers, Suarez seeks a rational support for his theory in several arguments....”
STONE, p. 44: “Following Thomas Aquinas, Suárez equates the actual judgements of recta ratio with ius naturale because it imposes commands or prohibitions upon the human will regarding what must be done ex naturali jure. After a series of authoritative opinions and supplementary proofs from Scripture and the Fathers, Suárez grounds his theory in several mutually enforcing arguments....”

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Case 20 (2004)

S 1795a = J 760a-760b; S 1795b = J 760b-761a; S 1796a = J 761a, 761b; S 1796b = J 761b, 762a; S 1797b = J 762b

EXAMPLE:
JORDAN, p. 762a: “The second complication in the relations of philosophy to theological topics arose from fierce disputes over the conclusions of the new sciences. The condemnation of Galileo is the most famous example in these quarrels, though also the most misunderstood. Religious opposition to the philosophical implications of new science made philosophic authors cautious in expressing their views.”
STONE, p. 1796b: “The second complication in the relations of philosophy to theological issues arose from fierce disputes over the conclusions of the nova scientia, or ‘new science.’ The condemnation of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) is one well-known example. Opposition to the metaphysical implications of the new science in certain religious quarters made many philosophers cautious in expressing their views.”

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Case 21 (2004)

Martin STONE, “Philosophy of religion”, in New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Maryanne Cline HOFWITZ, vol. 4 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2004), pp. 1804a-1806b (= S), plagiarizes:
S 1804a = J 759b
S 1805a = G 319
S 1805b = T 476
EXAMPLE:
TALIAFERRO, p. 476: “There are currently efforts to explore cross-cultural philosophy of religion, to articulate feminist challenges to traditional religions, to address postmodern versions of religion, and to consider a host of practical, moral and social problems from the standpoint of a philosophically articulate religious ethic, focusing on environmental, medical and political concerns.”
STONE, p. 1805b: “At the turn of the twenty-first century, there are efforts to explore cross-cultural philosophies of religion, to articulate feminist challenges to traditional religions, and to consider many political, moral, and social problems from the standpoint of a religiously motivated ethics or political theory.”

Case 22 (2004)
M.W.F. STONE, “[Philosophy:] Relations to Other Intellectual Realms”, in New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Maryanne Cline HOROWITZ, vol. 4 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2004), pp. 1779a-1783a (= S), plagiarizes:
S 1779a = P 216b; S 1779b = P 216b, 217a
S 1781b = N 2; S 1782a = N 2
EXAMPLE:
NADLER, p. 2: “What we tend to think of now as ‘philosophy,’ a broad but relatively precise discipline distinct from what we call ‘the sciences’ and ‘religion’ and characterized by certain kinds of (apparently unresolvable) questions, would have struck an early modern thinker as unreasonably narrow. The term ‘philosophy’ included in the seventeenth century a great deal more than it does today, including much of what we take to be the physical and biological sciences.”
STONE, p. 1781b: “That said, what in the early twenty-first century tends to be thought of as philosophy—a broad but relatively precise discipline distinct from the humanities, sciences, and religion and characterized by certain kinds of difficult and even irresoluble questions—would have struck an early modern thinker as a definition all too parsimonious in scope. The term philosophy in the seventeenth century included a great deal more than it does in the twenty-first, and this complicates any attempt to clarify the relationship of philosophy to other forms of human leaning [sic] in the early modern period. Philosophical learning would include the physical and biological sciences....”

Case 23 (2004)
M.W.F. STONE, “The Nature and Scope of Ordinary Morality: Some Reflections in the Spirit of Aurel Kolnai”, in Exploring the World of Human Practice: Readings in and about the Philos-
phy of Aurel Kolnai, ed. Zoltán BALÁZS and Francis DUNLOP (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), pp. 281-295 (= S), plagiarizes:

   Main text: S 282 = L 118; S 283 = L 118, 116. Endnotes: S3 = L 118; S4-5 = L 116; S6 = L 116-117

   S 286 = SF 29-30; S 287 = SF 30

   Endnotes: S8 = R 51 n. 26

EXAMPLES:

LOUDEN, p. 118: “...sorting through of the intuitions and beliefs people already have about the subject at hand, combined with an attempt to preserve the beliefs that are internally consistent: ‘We must, as in all other cases, set down the appearances [ta phainomena], and after first working through the puzzles, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the common beliefs [panta ta endoxa]... (NE 1145b2-7; cf. EE 1235b12-18).’”

STONE, pp. 282-283: “...sorting through the intuitions and beliefs agents already have about the nature of human action, and second with an attempt to preserve those existing beliefs and opinions about action which can be demonstrated to be internally consistent. Thus in book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics he writes: ‘We must, as in all cases, set down the appearances [ta phainomena], and after first working through the puzzles, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the common beliefs [panta ta endoxa]....” [Note 3, p. 294: “1145b2-7; cf. Eudemian Ethics 1235b12-180 [sic].”]

SARTRE/FRECHTMAN, pp. 29-30: “...for example, on his way to England he might, while passing through Spain, be detained indefinitely in a Spanish camp; he might reach England or Algiers and be stuck in an office at a desk job. As a result he was faced with two very different kinds of action: one concrete, immediate, but concerning only one individual; the other concerned an incomparably vaster group, a national collectivity....”

STONE, p. 286: “For example, on his way to England he might, while in transit through Spain, be detained indefinitely in a Spanish camp; he might reach England or Algiers and be stuck in an office at a desk job. As a result he was faced with two very different kinds of action: one concrete, immediate, but concerning only one individual; the other concerning an incomparably vaster group, a national collectivity....” [Note 15, p. 295: “Sartre, op. cit. [in note 14: “Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, Paris: Edition Nagel, 1970, first published 1947.”], pp. 39-42. My translation.”]
EXAMPLE:

FEINGOLD, p. 335: “In order to make sense of Soto’s interpretation, one would have to assume that St. Thomas’s analysis of the elicited desire of the will to know causes is only used in these texts in order to manifest the underlying innate desire of the will (or intellect), independently of knowledge.”

STONE, p. 224: “In order to commend the substance of Soto’s position, one would have to assume that Thomas’ analysis of the elicited desire of the will to know causes is only used in these texts in order to clarify the underlying innate appetite of the will (or intellect) independently of knowledge.”

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Case 25 (2005)

M.W.F. STONE, “Michael Baius (1513-89) and the Debate on ‘Pure Nature’: Grace and Moral Agency in Sixteenth-Century Scholasticism”, in Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity (Synthese Historical Library 57), ed. Jill KRAYE and Risto SAARINEN (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), pp. 51-90 (= S), plagiarizes:

S 55 = So 209b; S 57 = So 209b; S 58 = So 209b, 210a; S 63 = So 210a; S 64-65 = So 210a; S 66 = So 210b

S 59 = D 19b; S 60 = D 19b, 20a; S 61 = D 20b; S 62 = D 20b, 21a; S 64 = D 19a

S 69 = dL 123; S 70 = dL 124, 126, 127; S 71 = dL 127; S 72 = dL 128, 129; S 73 = dL 130, 131; S 74-81 = dL 133-147

(4) LAWRENCE FEINGOLD, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters (Roma: Pontificia Universitas Sanctae Crucis, 2001) (= F)
S 71 = F 218; S 72 = F 219

EXAMPLE:

DE LUBAC, p. 146: “There was nothing here preventing Soto from affirming, in an unpublished passage, quoted by Fr Bricio Torres, that ‘even if God had not decided to grant the beatific vision to the creature, he would not have been unjust to it, because he owed it nothing’. He then launched out into various hypotheses on the subject. All the theologians to whom Soto wished to remain faithful had admitted this before he did, at least implicitly, by saying that the beatific vision is a gratuitous gift.” [de Lubac, n. 121: “Op. cit., pp. 65-6; cf. pp. 84-5.”]

STONE, p. 80: “There was nothing here preventing Soto from affirming that even if God had not decided to grant the beatific vision to the first man, he would not have been unjust, because God owed the first man nothing. Soto then launched into various hypotheses on the subject. All the sources to which he wished to remain faithful had admitted this before him, at least implicitly, by saying that the beatific vision is a gratuitous gift.”

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Case 26 (2005)


S 511 = Kr 1300; S 512 = Kr 1300-1301; S 513 = Kr 1301 & n. 142, 1314 n. 141; S 514 = Kr 1314 n. 142; S 515, 516 = Kr 1302; S 531 = Kr 1302; S 532 = Kr 1302-1303

S 520-521 = F 69-70 (*)

(3) Ilkka Kantola, Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994) (= K)
S 521 n. 51 = K 112 n. 7; S 529 = K 143, 173-174, 21; S 530 = K 21-22, 174, 173

S 532 = M 23; S 533-534 = M 25-26; S 534 = M 18; S 535 = M 26-27; S 536-537 = M 27, 24; S 537 = M 24, 27-28; S 538 = M 28, 29; S 539 = M 29-30; S 540 = M 30-31

EXAMPLES:

Kraye, p. 1301: “Nevertheless, the axiomatic method of geometry slowly began to appear in ethical works. One of the first was Niels Hemmingsen’s De lege naturae apodictica methodus (1562). On the basis of the law of nature, which dictated that those things which preserve nature are required by it, Hemmingsen proposed certain immutable, infallible, and indubitable axioms, such as the principle that virtue was to be sought and vice avoided.”

Stone, p. 512: “...the axiomatic method of geometry in works of moral philosophy was used sparingly. One of the first attempts to use the method was the De lege naturae (1562) of Niels Hemmingsen (1513-1600). On the basis of specifying an idea of ‘a law of nature’, a maxim that dictated that those things preserved by nature are required by it, Hemmingsen proposed certain immutable, infallible, and indubitable axioms, such as the principle ‘that virtue was to be sought and vice avoided’.”

Franklin, pp. 69-70: “In general one should have moral certainty that a proposed course of action is right before doing it. To acquire moral certainty, one should consider what usually happens, what the authorities say, and what one’s learning suggests.”

Stone, p. 521: “In general one should have certitudo moralis that a proposed course of action is licit before doing it, and to acquire such practical confidence one should consider what usually happens, what the best authorities say, and what one’s learning suggests.”

(*) [Stone, p. 519, n. 41: “...see... J. Franklin... and his more recent book, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before Pascal (Baltimore, 2002), 64-101. This work came to my attention after completing the present essay.”]

Morgan, p. 24: “Even if he did once hold this optimistic opinion, however, it is clear that by the later years of his life Descartes had become convinced that his philosophical enterprise would never be completed in his lifetime. In either case, a problem arises: How is one to direct
one’s moral conduct in the indefinite absence of the perfect moral system, which cannot be formed until metaphysics and physics have been completed?”

STONE, pp. 536-537: “Even if he did once hold this optimistic opinion, it is clear that by the end of his life Descartes had become convinced that his philosophical enterprise would never be completed. In either case, a problem arises: how is one to direct one’s moral conduct in the indefinite absence of the perfect moral system, which cannot be constituted until metaphysics and physics are complete?”

Case 27 (2005)  

M.W.F. STONE, “‘Initium omnis peccati est superbia’. Jean Gerson’s Analysis of Pride in his Mystical Theology, Pastoral Thought, and Hamartiology”, in In the Garden of Evil. The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages (Papers in Medieval Studies 18), ed. Richard NEWHAUSER (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2005), pp. 293-323 (= S), plagiarizes:


S 293-294 = B 1015a


S 298 = P 316; S 299 = P 316-317; S 300 = P 317; S 301 = P 317, 318, 319; S 302 = P 319-320; S 303 = P 320


S 303-304 = C 682b-683a


S 304 = M 39; S 305 = M 39, 40, 41; S 306 = M 41, 42, 43, 44, 45; S 307 = M 45, 46, 49

(5) D. Catherine BROWN, Pastor and laity in the theology of Jean Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) (= Br)

S 309-310 = Br 65; S 311 = Br 65, 66; S 312 = Br 66-67; S 313 = Br 67; S 314 = Br 126; S 315-316 = Br 126-128; S 317 = Br 128, 129; S 318 = Br 129, 130; S 319-321 = Br 130-131

EXAMPLE:

BROWN, p. 129: “Pride in one’s own abilities, possessions, and virtues generally leads one to despise others not so well endowed. This leads Gerson to the discussion of another traditional set of daughters of pride. First there is despising per se; disdaining others because they lack the goods of fortune and grace that one has oneself; being ashamed of one’s poor friend. Less straightforward is the question of judging others. In the Modus brevis confitendi he suggests....”

STONE, pp. 317-318: “‘Pride in one’s own abilities, possessions, and virtues can further occasion the formation of a pejorative outlook on others not so well blessed. This leads Gerson to a discussion of the offspring of pride which include despising and disdaining others because they

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8 Richard NEWHAUSER contributed to the identification of sources for this entry.
lack the good fortune and graces belonging to oneself, and being ashamed of one’s less fortunate companions. Much more complicated is the issue of judging others. In the *Modus brevis confitendi* he suggests.

Case 28 (2006)^9^

M.W.F. STONE, “Adrian of Utrecht and the University of Louvain: Theology and the Discussion of Moral Problems in the Late Fifteenth Century”, in * Traditio 61* (2006), pp. 247-287 (= S), plagiarizes:

(1) Rudolf Branko HEIN, “*Gewissen*” bei Adrian von Utrecht (Hadrian VI.). Erasmus von Rotterdam und Thomas More: Ein Beitrag zur systematischen Analyse des Gewissensbegriffs in der katholischen nordeuropäischen Renaissance (Studien der Moraltheologie 10; Münster: Lit verlag, 1999) (= H)

S 249 n. 1 = H 175 n. 1; S 250-260 = H 175-182; S 261 = H 183; S 262-271 = H 183-191; S 275-281 = H 193-199; S 282 = H 199, n. 156, 199-200; S 283-285 = H 200-202; S 286 = H 202-203, n. 178

EXAMPLE:


STONE, p. 283, n. 181: “Adrian makes no direct reference to William of Ockham’s views and apparently ignores other aspects of the *via moderna*. In my view, the omission of the Venerable Inceptor is based not so much on Adrian’s general rejection of nominalism as on the prohibition in the faculty at Louvain, which not only forbade the use of the works of both Ockham and Buridan for teaching but led to several initiatives to ensure that it was carried out up to 1497 at least (see n. 38 above [= See De Jongh, Faculté, 56, and N. Greiteman, “Via antiqua en via moderna op de universiteiten van Engeland, Frankrijk en Duitschland,” *Studia Catholicca* (Roermond) 6 (1929/30): 149-63, and 7 (1930/31): 25-40, esp. 27. Further decrees in 1480, 1486, and 1497 in practice made the teaching of nominalist views in the faculties of Arts and Theology more and more difficult.]). The rare occurrence of references to Buridan is largely to be explained by the fact that they are limited to a few passages from his commentary on Aristotle’s *Ethics*; see QQ VI (n. 4 above), a. 1 ad rat. ante opp. 2 (fol. v° 52 G).”

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^9 Rudolf Branko HEIN contributed with material for this entry.
Case 29 (2006)\textsuperscript{10}


\[ S \text{ 106} = B \text{ 35-36} \]


\[ S \text{ 110} = D \text{ 235} \]


\[ S \text{ 113} = Sc \text{ 21-22} \]


\[ S \text{ 114} = So \text{ 161-162}; S \text{ 115} = So \text{ 162, 167}; S \text{ 116} = So \text{ 167, 168}; S \text{ 117} = So \text{ 168, 169, 168 n. 16}; S \text{ 118} = So \text{ 169-170}; S \text{ 119} = So \text{ 170}; S \text{ 120} = So \text{ 171-172}; S \text{ 121} = So \text{ 172}; S \text{ 122} = So \text{ 173}; S \text{ 123} = So \text{ 173}; S \text{ 125} = So \text{ 174}; S \text{ 126} = So \text{ 174, 175}; S \text{ 127} = So \text{ 175, 176, 178}; S \text{ 128} = So \text{ 176}; S \text{ 129} = So \text{ 176} \]


\[ S \text{ 119} = R \text{ 94 & n. 3} \]


\[ S \text{ 122} = T \text{ 549}; S \text{ 123} = T \text{ 549-550}; S \text{ 124} = T \text{ 550} \]


\[ S \text{ 125} = JT \text{ 200}; S \text{ 128} = JT \text{ 214, 384 n. 37} \]

EXAMPLES:

SOMMERVILLE, p. 167: “In essence, the proponents of verbal equivocation claimed that it is not lying to make a statement which possesses both true and false meanings, provided that it is true according to your sense (*sensus*) or meaning (*intentio*). It did not matter that you recognized that your words also bore a sense in which they were false.”

STONE, p. 116: “Supporters of verbal equivocation claimed that it was not lying to make a statement which possesses both true and false meanings, provided that it was true according to your sense (*sensus*) or meaning (*intentio*). It did not matter whether one recognised that one’s utterance also bore a sense in which it was false.”

TRENTMAN, p. 550: “Here Suárez might have done well to have taken greater heed of the doctrine of his countryman, Bañez, who argued that it is impossible to lie to oneself or to another,

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{10} Carlos Steel contributed to the identification of sources for this entry.} \]
e.g., God, whom one cannot hope to deceive. Thomas Sanchez also followed this tendency to internalize the problem of lying. Building again on the distinction between spoken and written words and mental language, he argued that the *intentio* is all that matters; speech, strictly speaking, is entirely interior; conventional signs (spoken and written words) are related only *mere materialiter*, in effect accidentally, to the lie.”

STONE, p. 124: “Here Suárez might have done well to have followed the teaching of his fellow Spaniard Domingo Bañez who asserted that it is impossible to lie to oneself and to another, e.g. God, who one cannot hope to deceive. Tomás Sanchez also followed this tendency to internalise lying. Building again on the distinction between spoken and written words and mental language, he argued that the *intentio* is all that matters, speech *in sensu strictu* [sic] is entirely interior; conventional signs (spoken and written words) are related *mere materialiter*, in effect accidentally, to the lie.”

Case 30 (2006)

Martin W.F. STONE, “The Antiquarian and the Moderniser: Giovanni Lorenzo Berti (1696-1766), Pietro Tamburini (1737-1827), and Contrasting Defences of the Augustinian Teaching on Unbaptised Infants in Eighteenth-Century Italy”, in *Quaestio* 6 (2006), pp. 335-372 (= S), plagiarizes:


S 343-344 = W 522a

(2) George J. DYER, *The Denial of Limbo and the Jansenist Controversy* (Pontificia Facultas Theologica, Seminarii Sanctae Mariae ad Lacum: Dissertationes ad Lauream 24; Mundelein, IL: Saint Mary of the Lake Seminary, 1955) (= D)

S 347 = D 113; S 348 = D 114; S 349 = D 114; S 350-358 = D 114-121; S 363-372 = D 123-130


S 360 n. 112 = Dr 702a, 702b


S 362 = C 403

EXAMPLE:

DYER, p. 127: “We can now see a little more clearly the active rôle which the question of unbaptized infants played in Tamburini’s polemic. It offered him a many-sided weapon with which he could rake and tear the Molinists he so cordially detested. Tamburini considered Molinism to be nothing else than the Pelagian heresy, somewhat modified and embellished by its authors.”

STONE, p. 368: “We can now discern much more clearly the active role which the question of unbaptised infants played in Tamburini’s polemic. It afforded him a multifaceted [sic] weapon with which he could rake and tear the Molinists whom he so detested. An ardent Jansenist, Tamburini considered Molinism to be nothing less than the Pelagian heresy, somewhat modified and embellished by later day Jesuit authors.”
Case 31 (2006)


S 304 = K 699a; S 307 = K 699b; S 308 = K 699b, 700a; S 309 = K 700a

S 307 = M 297a, 297b

S 310 = Mi 611b, 612a; S 311 = Mi 612a, 612b

Main text: S 315 = A 169. Endnotes: S72 = A n. 83; S73 = A nn. 86-87; S75 = A nn. 90-91

EXAMPLES:
KENNEDY, p. 699b: “(a) The angels and human souls are without matter, but every material composite being (compositum) has two parts, prime matter and substantial form. In a composite being which has substantial unity and is not merely an aggregate of distinct units, there can be but one substantial form. The substantial form of man is his soul (anima rationalis) to the exclusion of any other soul and of any other substantial form. The principle of individuation, for material composites, is matter with its dimensions: without this there can be no merely numerical multiplication....”
STONE, p. 307: “First was the idea that angels and human souls are without matter, but that every material composite being (compositum) has two parts, prime matter and substantial form. The thought here is that in a composite being which has substantial unity, and is not merely an aggregate of distinct units, there can be but one substantial form. For Thomists, the substantial form of man is his soul (anima rationalis), to the exclusion of any other soul and of any other substantial form. The principle of individuation, for material composites, is matter with its dimensions: without this there can be no merely numerical multiplication....”
ARIEW, p. 169: “He accepted analogical predication, siding with Thomas, but thought that a concept of being can be found which is strictly unitary, thus adopting Scotus’s position on this issue: “the proper and adequate formal concept of being as such is one.” Suárez added that this was the common opinion, defended by “Scotus and all his disciples.” Conversely, Suárez accepted the Scotist doctrine of matter’s existing without form by divine power, but sided with Thomas on the plurality of forms.... Most important, he argued against Thomas that there is a third distinction other than real and rational.”
STONE, p. 315: “For example, he accepted the doctrine of analogical predication, siding with Thomas, but thought that a concept of being (esse) can be found which is strictly unitary, thereby supporting the communis opinio defended by Scotus and his disciples. Conversely, he embraced the Scotist doctrine of matter’s existing without form by divine power, but sided with Thomas on the issue of the plurality of forms.... Against Thomas, he argued that there is a third distinction other than the ‘real and rational.’”
Case 32 (2006)


S 125 n. 13 = B 117 & n. 3

S 125-126 = H 90; S 126-127 = H 91

S 127-129 = Sh 15-16; S 129-130 = Sh 17-18; S 131 = Sh 18-19

(4) Clarence Gallagher, S.J., Canon Law and the Christian Community: The Role of Law in the Church According to the Summa Aurea of Cardinal Hostiensis (Analecta Gregoriana 208; Roma: Università Gregoriana Editrice, 1978) (= G)
S 135-137 = G 130-132; S 137-138 = G 136-137

S 146-147 = JT 116

S 148-151 = R 28-32; S 151-152 = R 33-34; S 152 = R 36 & n. 60; S 153 = R 36 n. 60, 37, 39; S 154-155 = R 51-52

EXAMPLE:

Sherman, p. 15: “On Aristotle’s view, then, the benefits of proceduralism never obscure the fact of written law’s uneasy fit to the particular case. This emerges as the central focus of Aristotle’s discussion:

In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally (καθόλου), but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case (ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον), though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less correct; for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the start. (NE 1137b14 ff.)

Law is thus inevitably general. But it is limited as a result.”

Sherman, p. xiv: “Unless otherwise noted, the translations of Aristotle are my own.”

Stone, pp. 127-128: “In Aristotle’s view, the putative benefits of assorted legal procedures will never disguise the fact that written laws cannot always meet the demands of particular cases. This emerges as the central focus of Aristotle’s discussion at Nicomachean Ethics V, 10, 1137b14-19:

In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally (καθόλου), but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case (ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον), though it is ignorant [sic] of the possibility of error. And it is more or less correct; for the error is not in the law nor in the
40 Cases of Plagiarism

legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the start.

Law is necessarily general; and it is limited as a result of this condition.”

[STONE, p. 122 n. 4: “All translations from Greek and Latin sources are my own unless stated.”]

Case 33 (2007)


(1) Marcus HELLYER, Catholic Physics. Jesuit Natural Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005) (= H)
S 215-216 = H 22; S 218 = H 22; S 219-220 = H 23

(2) João MADEIRA, Pedro da Fonseca’s Isagoge Philosophica and the Predicables from Boethius to the Lovanienses [Ph.D. thesis; “Promotor: Prof. Dr. Martin W.F. Stone”] (Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, November 2006) (= M)
S 229 = M 1; S 230 = M 1-2; S 231 = M 2; S 232 = M 2-3; S 233 = M 3-4; S 234 = M 5; S 235 = M 5-6, 5; S 236 = M 6; S 237 = M 6-7; S 241-242 = M 7

S 238 = G 731; S 239 = G 731-732

S 242 = MM 515; S 243 = MM 515-516; S 244 = MM 516-517; S 245 = MM 517; S 246 = MM 517-518; S 247 = MM 518, 520; S 248 = MM 520-521; S 249 = MM 521, 522; S 250 = MM 522, 523; S 251 = MM 524, 525; S 252 = MM 525

EXAMPLES:

MADEIRA, p. 5: “At his own request, Fonseca was relieved of teaching activities in 1562, in order to devote himself to the necessary research and writing of his part of the commentaries on the Isagoge of Porphyry and on the Categories of Aristotle. However, he still had other responsibilities within the Order. One of his tasks was to write a textbook to be utilised as an introduction to philosophy....”

STONE, p. 234: “At his own request, Fonseca was relieved of teaching activities in 1562, in order to devote himself to the necessary research and writing of his part of the commentaries on the ‘Isagoge’ of Porphyry and Aristotle’s ‘Categories’. However, he still had other responsibilities within the Jesuit order. One of his allotted tasks was to write a textbook to be used as an introduction to philosophy....”

MARTINS, p. 525: “Fonseca esquematiza os diversos aspectos estruturantes da acção humana em sete momentos distintos nos quais razão vontade colaboram e interagem. É importante não perder de vista que estamos perante uma compreensão teleológica do agir humano que se supõe compatível com uma teoria do bem fortemente hierarquizada. Quanto aos momentos principais

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11 Carlos STEEL contributed to the identification of sources for this entry.
da acção humana, considerada genericamente...."

STONE, pp. 251-252: "Fonseca schematises the diverse aspects of action in seven distinct moments in which reason and will interact and then collaborate [...]. It is important to appreciate that this scheme presents a teleological understanding of human action which is predicated on a hierarchical theory of the good. With respect to the principal moments of human action considered generically...."

Case 34 (2007)


(1) Arthur P. MONAHAN, From Personal Duties towards Personal Rights. Late Medieval and Early Modern Political Thought, 1300-1600 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994) (= M)
S 337 = M 145-146; S 338 = M 146-147; S 339 = M 147-148

S 339 = PL xiv; S 340 = PL xiv, xv; S 341 = PL xv-xvi; S 342 = PL xxiii, xxiv; S 343 = PL xxiv-xxv, xxv-xxvi; S 344 = PL xxvi-xxvii

S 339 = H 12; S 350 = H 182-183

S 341 = S-S 62, 63; S 342 = S-S 63, 64

(5) Annabel S. BRETT, Liberty, right and nature. Individual rights in later scholastic thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) (= B)
S 345 = B 142-143; S 346 = B 143, 145, 147, 150; S 347 = B 155, 156

S 347-348 = GP i

S 348 = Be 28, 29, 32, 33; S 349 = Be 35

(8) Frank Bartholomew COSTELLO, S.J., The political philosophy of Luis de Molina, S.J. (1535-1600) (Bibliotheca Instituti Historicci S.I. 38; Roma: Institutum Historicum S.I., 1974) (= C)
S 351 = C 202-203, 204, 205; S 352 = C 205, 206, 207, 208; S 353 = C 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 218, 219, 223; S 354 = C 223, 224

(9) Reijo WILENIUS, The social and political theory of Francisco Suárez (Helsinki: Suomalainen
Kirjallisuuden Kirjapaino, 1963) (= W)
S 356 = W 39, 40, 41; S 361 = W 66, 68; S 362 = W 41-42
EXAMPLE:

COSTELLO, pp. 203-204: “It was Soto who substituted respublica for communitas to remove any doubt that St. Thomas had meant a perfect society and not just any community. Statutes and other legislative acts of communities less than a perfect commonwealth are not to be considered laws in the strict sense.”

STONE, p. 351: “It was Soto who had substituted respublica for communitas in order to remove any doubt that Aquinas had meant his definition of law to be applied to a perfect society and not just any legislative community. For Molina, the statutes and legislative acts of any society that fall below the standards of a perfect commonwealth are not to be considered laws in the strict sense of that term.”

Case 35 (2009)12

(1) Rudolf Branko HEIN, “Gewissen” bei Adrian von Utrecht (Hadrian VI.), Erasmus von Rotterdam und Thomas More: Ein Beitrag zur systematischen Analyse des Gewissensbegriffs in der katholischen nordeuropäischen Renaissance (Studien der Moraltheologie 10; Münster: Lit verlag, 1999) (= H1)
S 430-432 = H1 228-232; S 433-434 = H1 233-234
S 434 = H2 38; S 435 = H2 38, 39; S 436 = H2 39; S 437 = H2 39; S 438 = H2 39, 40; S 439 = H2 40; S 440 = H2 40, 41-42; S 441 = H2 42; S 442 = H2 42; S 443 = H2 42, 43
EXAMPLES:

HEIN, “Gewissen”, p. 229: “Dabei gründet er sich auf eine Textversion bei Ambrosius, der an betreffender Stelle corde puro verwendet habe. Cor bezeichnet hier also das sittlich handelnde Subjekt selbst, welches durch das zugefügte Adjektiv (simplex / purus) in seiner Ganzheit sittlich qualifiziert wird. Man möchte einen ähnlichen Bedeutungshorizont vermuten, wo von einem Menschen die Rede ist, der bona conscientia einen um Rat suchenden zu gelehrteren Menschen schicken könne, obwohl er wisse, daß diese eine ihm entgegengesetzte Meinung verträt. Da diese ‘klassische’ Wendung nicht wieder erneut auftaucht, läßt sich allenfalls mutmaßen, daß conscientia hier wiederum dem sittlich agierenden Subjekt zugeordnet ist, auf dessen Integrität bzw. aufrechte sittliche Überzeugung mit dem Adjektiv bona abgehoben werden soll....”

STONE, pp. 430-431: “He bases this view on a version of the text occurring in Ambrose, who quoted the term as cor purus or ‘pure heart’, where cor signifies the actual subject of the moral action, which is then qualified by the adjective that accompanies it such as simplex (‘simple’) or purus (‘pure’). A similar attitude seems to be present in Adrian’s discussion of the issue whether a person could in ‘good conscience’ (bona conscientia) send someone to seek the

12 Rudolf Branko HEIN contributed with material for this entry.
advice of learned authorities, even though he knows that these individuals hold an opinion contrary to his own. Here we can surmise that conscientia also relates to the subject of the moral act, the adjective bona emphasizing that person’s integrity or righteous moral conviction.”


STONE, p. 435: “After the lex divina was the natural law (lex naturalis). Inherent in the human mind, it was made accessible to the intellect enlightened [sic] by divine light. Its material content was its first formal principle, the ‘golden rule’ for Ficino, that God is to be venerated.” [Stone, p. 435, n. 73: “Ficino, Comm. in Phil, cap. 37, in Marsilio Ficino: The Philebus Commentary, ed. and trans. M. J. B. Allen (Berkeley, London & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975; reprint, 1979), 375: ‘Quis primo gustavit bonum? Intellectus, qui rationem concept boni dormiente etiam voluptate,... Primum propositum est in intellectu atque est eiusmodi: bonum quo caremus comparandum.’”]

Case 36 (2009)

M.W.F. STONE, “Ruard Tapper (1487-1559) on liberum arbitrium: Biblical Exegesis, Scholastic Theology, and Fighting the Cause of the Counter Reformation in Sixteenth-Century Louvain”, in Infant Milk or Hardy Nourishment? The Bible for Lay People and Theologians in the Early Modern Period (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 221), ed. W. FRANÇOIS and A.A. DEN HOLLANDER (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), pp. 243-296 (= S), plagiarizes:

(1) Rev. Valentine J. PETER, The Doctrine of Ruard Tapper (1487-1559) Regarding Original Sin and Justification. Pars dissertationis ad Lauream in Facultate S. Theologiae apud Pontificiam Universitatem S. Thome de Urbe (Roma: Pontificia Studiorum Universitas a S. Thoma Aq. in Urbe, 1965) (= P)

S 250 = P 19; S 251 = P 22, 21; S 252 = P 23, 24; S 253 = P 24, 25; S 254 = P 25, 26, 28; S 255 = P 28, 29, 27; S 256 = P 27-28, 122; S 257 = P 122-123; S 258 = P 30; S 277 = P 123, 124, 54, 26; S 278 = P 37-38; S 279 = P 38; S 280 = P 39, 26, 40; S 281 = P 40-41; S 282 = P 41-42; S 283 = P 42-43; S 284 = P 43; S 286 = P 44; S 287 = P 44-45; S 288 = P 45-46; S 289 = P 46-47; S 290 = P 48-49; S 291 = P 49-50; S 292 = P 50-51; S 293 = P 51-52; S 294 = P 52-54; S 295 = P 54


S 262 = Po 652, 653; S 263 = Po 654, 655, 660, 661, 654; S 264 = Po 661; S 265 = Po 661-662; S 266 = Po 662; S 268 = Po 663; S 269 = Po 663, 664; S 270 = Po 665, 666; S 271 = Po 666; S 272 = Po 666


S 265 = G 11-12, 273 n. 7
PETER, pp. 52-53: “Because Tapper here indicates that sanctifying grace is an entitive habit rather than an operative one and because he says that from it flow the operative habits or virtues, one is led to conclude that for him sanctifying grace and charity are distinct as an entitive habit is distinct from an operative habit. Once again he does not come right out and state this point blank but it is his meaning. Note too that he only says it is the more probable opinion that sanctifying grace is not an operative habit.”

STONE, p. 294: “Because Tapper indicates here that sanctifying grace is an entitive habit rather than an operative one, and because he says it flows from the virtues, one is led to conclude that for him sanctifying grace and charity are distinct as an entitive habit is distinct from an operative habit. Note too that he only says it is “the more probable opinion” that sanctifying grace is not an operative habit.”

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**Case 37 (2009)**


S 521 = D 32, 43-44

S 522 = G 130-131

S 524-525 = O 330-331

S 525-526 = C 12
S 533-534 = B 66-67

S 534 = W 537b

EXAMPLES:

**Gallagher**, pp. 130-131: “Hostiensis was, however, equally insistent that true justice must always be tempered by compassion and administered in a humane manner. While it is true that a judge is not free to alter at will statutory penalties clearly enacted by the law, he does have greater freedom where no such legal limitations exist, and in these cases Hostiensis urges him always to observe equity and adopt the course that will prove to be more humane in the circumstances.... He should always exercise compassion, even when he has to inflict punishment... the need to temper justice with compassion is a theme that runs through the whole of the *Summa*.”

**Stone**, p. 522: “According to Hostiensis, justice must always be tempered by compassion and administered in a humane manner. While a judge is not free to alter at will statutory penalties clearly enacted by the law, he does have greater freedom where no such legal limitations exist, and in these cases, Hostiensis urges him always to observe equity and adopt the course that will prove to be more kindhearted in the circumstances. Thus the judge should exercise compassion, even when he has to inflict punishment. The need to temper justice with compassion is a theme that runs throughout the *Summa aurea*.”

**Craun**, p. 12: “‘Predicare’ was itself a broad term. It did, of course, signify delivering sermons, which increased in number and status during the thirteenth century. But it also conveyed, more generally, teaching others how to live a Christian life – catechesis in any form, like direct instruction and questions during confession. In all these ways, preaching was the principal means used by priests to move the laity (and, sometimes, other priests) to contrition and, then, to auricular confession. After the Fourth Lateran Council had required annual auricular confession and communion of all Christians, English diocesan statutes established a clear connection between preaching about sin in the vernacular and confession. For example, a statute from Worcester (1240) states that, since observing the Decalogue and fleeing the Seven Sins are necessary [sic] to salvation, they must assume an important role in confession, and they must be preached frequently to the people.”

**Stone**, pp. 525-526: “...*predicare* (preaching) was a broad term. While in the first instance it signified preaching and delivering sermons – which increased in number and status as the thirteenth century developed – it also conveyed more generally teaching others how to live a Christian life, being a form of *catechesis* directly related to confessional practice. In this way, preaching was the principal means used to move the laity (and indeed other priests) to contrition, and then to confession. After the Fourth Lateran Council had required annual confession of all Christians, English diocesan statutes (to cite one example among countless others) established a clear connection between preaching about sin in the vernacular and confession. A statute from Worcester in 1240 states, for instance, that since “the Decalogue and fleeing the Seven Sins are necessary for salvation,” they must assume an important role in confession, and they must be preached frequently to the people.”

**Case 38 (2009)**

M.W.F. Stone, “Punch’s riposte: the Irish contribution to early modern Scotism from Maurice
O’Fihely OFMConv. to Anthony Rourke OFMObS.,” in The Irish Contribution to European Scholastic Thought, ed. James McEvoy and Michael Dunne (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2009), pp. 137-191 (= S), plagiarizes:

S 147 = G 384, 395 & n. 83; S 156 = G 381, 379-380, 370 n. 27; S 167 = G 392, 380, 392; S 168 = G 392, 396 & n. 86; S 169 = G 396 & n. 84; S 170 = G 386-387, 388; S 171 = G 388-389

S 148 = B 9, 10

S 173 = M 400, 401

EXAMPLES:
Gibrin, pp. 388-389: “It is worthy of note that Hickey used the text of the fourth book of Sentences which had been corrected and emended by his master MacCaghwell in 1620, and that he followed verbatim the scholia or divisions of the text adopted by his former master.... Apart from his Nitela Franciscanae Religionis which he published at Lyons in 1627 under the pseudonym Dermitius Thaddaeus..., he was also the author of a work on the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin.”

Stone, p. 171: “Hickey used the text of the fourth book which had been corrected and emended by Cavellus in 1620, and followed verbatim the scholia adopted by his former teacher. Apart from his polemical Nitela Franciscanae Religionis, which he published under the pseudonym Dermitius Thaddaeus, Hickey also published a work on the Immaculate Conception.”

Millet, p. 401: “Three opuscules, in octavo, on the death, the redemption and the baptism of Our Lady were published in Rome in 1655-1656 and were a by-product of Wadding’s labours, as a member of the Spanish mission, to promote the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. The first and second of these little works are a commentary on the Scotist teaching concerning the preservative redemption of the Virgin Mary....”

STONE, p. 173: “Three other opuscula on the death, the redemption, and the baptism of the Virgin Mary, were published in Rome between 1655-1656, and yet again were the by-product of Wadding’s membership of the Spanish mission. The first and second of these tracts purport to be a commentary on Scotus’ own teaching concerning the preservative redemption of the Virgin Mary....”

Case 39 (2009)\textsuperscript{13}

M.W.F. Stone, “Adrian of Utrecht As a Moral Theologian”, in De paus uit de lage landen. Adrianus VI 1459-1523. Catalogus bij de tentoonstelling ter gelegenheid van het 550ste ge-

\textsuperscript{13} Rudolf Branko Hein contributed with material for this entry.
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boortejaar van Adriaan van Utrecht (Supplementa Humanistica Lovaniensia 27), ed. Michiel Verweij (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2009), pp. 19-44 (= S), plagiarizes:

(1) Rudolf Branko Hein, “Gewissen” bei Adrian von Utrecht (Hadrian VI.), Erasmus von Rotterdam und Thomas More: Ein Beitrag zur systematischen Analyse des Gewissensbegriffs in der katholischen nordeuropäischen Renaissance (Studien der Moraltheologie 10; Münster: Lit verlag, 1999) (= H)

S 21-28 = H 176-181; S 29 = H 192, 195; S 30 = H 196, 197 & n. 149; S 31-32 = H 197-198; S 33 = H 199 & n. 156; S 34-36 = H 200-202; S 37 = H 202, 203 & n. 178; S 38-42 = H 228-234

EXAMPLE:


Stone, pp. 21-22: “Having the good fortune to be born into a family of means, Groote completed the first stages of an ecclesiastical career (studies in Paris, MA there in 1358, diplomatic missions, canonry and benefices), until he was led to a spiritual conversion by a meeting with a former student friend, the Prior of the Carthusian monastery of Monnikhuisen. He entered this institution for a few years taking the name of Donatus, and alongside his daily round of manual work and prayer made a deep study of the works of mystical writers, especially John of Ruysbroeck (1293-1381).”

Case 40 (2009)


S 206 = G 384; S 208 = G 379, 380; S 213 = G 392, 380; S 214 = G 387; S 215 = G 387, 388-389


S 216 = M 401

EXAMPLES:

Giblin, pp. 388-389: “It is worthy of note that Hickey used the text of the fourth book of Sentences which had been corrected and emended by his master MacCaghwell in 1620, and that he followed verbatim the scholia or divisions of the text adopted by his former master... Apart from his Nitela Franciscanae Religionis which he published at Lyons in 1627 under the pseu-
donym Dermitius Thaddaeus... he was also the author of a work on the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin.”

STONE, p. 215: “Hickey used the text of the fourth book which had been corrected and emended by Mac Aingil in 1620, and followed verbatim the *scholia* adopted by his former teacher. Apart from his polemical *Nitela Franciscanae Religionis* which he published under the pseudonym Dermitius Thaddaeus, which as we noted earlier sought to defend the honour of his order, Scotus, and former teacher Mac Aingil, Hickey also published a work on the Immaculate Conception.”

MILLET, p. 401: “Three opuscules, in octavo, on the death, the redemption and the baptism of Our Lady were published in Rome in 1655-1656 and were a by-product of Wadding’s labours, as a member of the Spanish mission, to promote the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. The first and second of these little works are a commentary on the Scotist teaching concerning the preservative redemption of the Virgin Mary.”

STONE, p. 216: “Three other short works on the death, the redemption, and the baptism of the Virgin Mary, were published in Rome between 1655-6, and yet again, were the by-product of Wadding’s membership of the Spanish mission. The first and second of these tracts purport to be a commentary on Scotus’ own teaching concerning the preservative redemption of the Virgin Mary....”

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